The Law of Intermodal Transportation:
What It Was, What It Is, What It Should
Be
Paul Stephen
Dempsey, Ph.D., J.D.
Director of the
National Center for Intermodal Transportation
Director of the
Transportation Law Program
Professor of Law
University of Denver
DISCLAIMER: The contents of
this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts
and the accuracy of the information presented herein. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the
Department of Transportation, University Transportation Centers Program, in the
interest of information exchange. The
U.S. Government assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof. The authors retain the right to publish the
report in appropriate journals and books.
The United States has assumed a
position of world leadership in its efforts to reduce or eliminate tariff
barriers, trade inhibitions, and investment restrictions, enabling goods,
technology, services, and capital to move freely between States in the
international arena.[1] As a part of this effort, the United States
has sought to reduce, to the extent practicable, domestic impediments in the
field of transportation so as to optimize the unobstructed transit of
commodities between inland origins and overseas destinations and between
overseas origins and inland destinations.
The U. S. also has concluded formal and informal bilateral and
multilateral agreements designed to minimize the barriers which obstruct the
free flow of commerce between nations, and to minimize domestic restraints on
transnational commercial activity. As a result of these efforts, we are
witnessing a spectacular increase in the importation and exportation of goods.
These overwhelming increases in
foreign trade have been brought about, in part, by a diminution in transport
inhibitions. In a circular fashion, the
present reexamination of the existing legal framework in the field of
transportation is, to a certain extent, attributable to these massive increases
in foreign commercial activity and the concomitant demands for an efficient and
economical transportation network which have inevitably arisen therefrom.[2] It is this contemporary evaluation of
traditional legal and technological concepts in the field of international transportation
to which this essay is addressed.
In our era of rapidly diminishing
impediments to the free flow of capital, goods, technology, and services
between nations, transnational commercial activity has become extremely
important to our national economy. New
frontiers are being broken as raw materials and manufactured products move more
freely between nations which have heretofore shared little in culture, history,
religion, race, or economic and political philosophy. Certainly, governmental initiatives designed to eliminate trade
inhibitions are responsible for much of this growth. Tariff walls are crumbling.
The world economy is prospering.
The interdependencies that flourish between members of the world
community as a result of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements enhance
the possibility of achieving long-term political stability, economic growth,
and global peace. It has become the
position of the United States that increased international economic cooperation
will inevitably lead to increased political toleration and peaceful
coexistence.
Innovations in the field of
transportation have made possible increased commercial activity promoting
greater interdependency between nations.
Intermodal transport innovation in the United States has been of
essentially two kinds: (1)
technological innovation, enabling commodities and individuals to move with
greater speed, efficiency, and economy; and (2) regulatory innovation by
Federal agencies responsible for regulating the rates and routes of
international carriers.
Of the technological innovations,
the “container revolution” is perhaps the most significant, for it has done
more to foster the growth of international trade than any other single
intermodal breakthrough. Containerization
permits individual commodities to be loaded by the consignor at the point of
origin without interim handling again until the container arrives at its
ultimate destination and is unloaded by the consignee. Between the points of origin and
destination, the trailer or container may be transported as a single unit by
motor, rail, water, or air carriers with a substantial reduction in transit
time, expense, loss, damage, and theft from that experienced under traditional
break-bulk carriage.[3] Containerization may also produce greater
energy efficiency in transportation and stabilize transport costs.[4] By the late 1970s, containerized
trailer-on-flatcar [TOFC] movements represented 7.2 percent of tonnage moved by
rail;[5]
it was anticipated that air/motor through movements would exceed 6.5 million
billion-ton miles during this period, a growth rate of approximately six
percent.[6] Moreover, there are a number of recent
developments that may cause this trend to accelerate.[7] By the late 1990s, rail intermodal
transportation was a $7.3 billion business with an anticipated annual growth
rate of between 6-8%.
Intermodal transportation utilizes
the inherent advantages of each mode involved, creating synergies and
efficiencies not otherwise attainable.
The service provided is different from and superior to that available
from either mode alone. Carriers joined
in intermodal combinations seek to provide a complete, "seamless"
intermodal through service from origin to destination. Carriers whose services have historically been
restricted to one mode of transportation are transforming into large
multi-modal companies through joint ownership[8]
or contractual agreement. Whether used to create new types of service, to lower
rates to attract more traffic, or to lower costs to increase profitability,
these arrangements are reshaping transportation.
Among the more dramatic contemporary
shifts in transportation patterns has been the growth of multimodal
international movements. For import or
export traffic that is originating from or destined to U.S. points,
rail/water/motor carrier combinations are often employed. Moreover, the United States has become a
"land bridge" for a substantial amount of traffic that neither
originates from nor is destined to U.S. shippers, but instead is moving between
Europe and the Far East.[9]
Statutory and regulatory innovation has also
contributed to the enormous contemporary growth of transnational commercial
activity. This latter type of
innovation shall be explored in this essay.
After this introduction, the chapter is divided into three primary
sections. In the first, we examine the
origins of intermodal law and regulation.
In the second, we review the contemporary legal landscape on intermodal
transportation. In the third, we
recommend several potential improvements in the legal regime.
II.
INTERMODAL TRANSPORT LAW:
WHAT IT WAS
THE PRE-DEREGULATION
DIVISION OF REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES: ICC, CAB, & FMC
Prior to deregulation there was a
tripartite division of regulatory responsibility over foreign commerce
transportation in this nation among three separate Federal administrative
agencies: the Interstate Commerce Commission [ICC],[10]
the Civil Aeronautics Board [CAB],[11]
and the Federal Maritime Commission [FMC].[12] Prior to its sunset in 1996, the ICC was by
far the largest of the three, regulating the surface transportation of over
18,000 railroads, motor carriers, pipelines, domestic water carriers, brokers,
and freight forwarders. Prior to its
sunset in 1985, the CAB had jurisdiction over the transportation of direct air
carriers (airlines) and indirect air carriers (e.g., air freight forwarders)
operating within, to, and from the United States.[13] More than eighty domestic air carriers were
subject to the jurisdiction of the CAB.[14] The FMC regulated all United States flag and
foreign flag carriers operating in foreign commerce, and United States carriers
serving Alaska and Hawaii. Almost forty
domestic maritime carriers were subject to regulation by the FMC.[15] Today, the agency holds jurisdiction over
ocean transportation, in domestic-offshore and foreign commerce, by vessel
operators, non-vessel operators [NVOs], and independent ocean freight
forwarders.[16]
In 1887 Congress promulgated the Act
to Regulate Commerce,[17]
creating the ICC and affording to it the primary responsibility to prevent and
correct rate discriminations by railroads.
It was not until the Transportation Act of 1920,[18]
however, that Congress articulated a specific declaration of policy for the agency. That Act required the ICC “to promote,
encourage and develop water transportation, service, and facilities in
connection with the commerce of the United States, and to foster and preserve
in full vigor both rail and water transportation.”[19] After 1920, the scope of Interstate and
foreign commerce subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC expanded
dramatically. For example, the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935[20]
brought for-hire common and contract motor carriers within the ambit of ICC
regulation. The Transportation Act of
1940[21]
brought Interstate water carriers within the Commission’s jurisdiction. Two years later, freight forwarders were
brought within the regulatory scheme.[22]
It was in the 1940 legislation that
Congress expressed its most significant declaration of the national
transportation policy up to that time.
It directed that the ICC shouuld:
Provide for fair and impartial regulation of all
modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act . . . so
administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to
promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound
economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to
encourage establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation
services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or
unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several
States and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages
and equitable working conditions – all to the end of developing, coordinating,
and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as
well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense.[23]
This
expression of policy delegated to the ICC the responsibility for coordinating all modes of transportation, including
those not subject to its regulation.
In contrast, however, the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958[24]
confined its policy declaration to air transportation and directed the CAB to
coordinate transportation between air carriers. More specifically, it required:
(a) The encouragement and development of an
air-transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of
the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service,
and of the national defense.
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such a manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of
safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to
improve the relations between and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by
air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue
preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of
the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service,
and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics.[25]
Similarly, the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936[26]
emphasized that the FMC should concern itself with but a single mode of
transportation:
It is
necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and domestic
commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to
carry its domestic water-borne commerce and substantial portion of the
water-borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to
provide shipping service essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic and
foreign water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval
and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and
operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United States, insofar
as may be practicable, (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most
suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a
trained and efficient citizen personnel.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to foster the
development and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine, and (e)
supplemented by efficient facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair.[27]
As can be seen, the ICC was given a
unique responsibility to foster the coordination of a national transportation
system by all modes. Of the several
regulatory agencies, the ICC alone was charged with the duty to consider all
transportation modes in the exercise of its regulatory functions, and not only
those within its jurisdictional ambit.
The ICC recognized that the “development of a truly coordinated
transportation system must, within the terms of [its] statutory mandate, take
precedence over the more narrow interests of those carriers directly subject to
the Interstate Commerce Act.”[28] The ICC recognized that “[t]he shipping
public must have available not only a ready choice of all modes of carriage,
but also a workable flexibility which will enable them to utilize to the
fullest the inherent advantages of each mode in coordinated movements of single
shipments.”[29] The ICC was subject to a unique statutory
directive to protect the competition among the different modes of
transportation subject to its regulation.
It could maintain the rates of one carrier to protect the traffic of
another if necessary to protect an “inherent advantage” of the latter.[30]
Within this multi-agency network,
the emergence of the container revolution and the growth of foreign trade
created a need for efficiency and cooperation among the Federal regulatory
bodies.[31]
FACILITATING THE CONTAINER REVOLUTION
Containerization, which has
undergone an enormous growth in recent decades, represents an expeditious,
economical, and efficient means of facilitating intermodal transportation. In its simplest form, it involves the
shipment of freight as a unit from origin to ultimate destination in vans or
boxes.[32] The typical containerized export movement,
for example, might involve (a) the loading of widgets by their manufacturer
into a single van-type container, (b) the movement of the container by motor carrier
from the manufacturer’s inland domicile to the port facilities of Savannah, (c)
the placement at Savannah of the container aboard a maritime vessel destined
for Hamburg, (d) the movement at Hamburg of the container from the maritime
vessel to a rail flatcar destined for Stuttgart, and (e) the unloading at
Stuttgart of the container’s contents by the consignee. Had the widgets in the above example not
moved via container, their transport would have necessitated individual loading
and unloading at each of the aforementioned points, thereby increasing labor
costs, time consumption, and damage and loss claims.[33] Containerized transportation, in contrast,
obviates the need for individualized handling of commodities at points other
than the ultimate origin and destination.
Containerization thereby substantially reduces transit time, handling
and export packaging expenditures, and the possibility of damage and pilferage.[34] It permits freight to be loaded at inland
origins and remain untouched throughout the journey until the containers arrive
at inland destinations. Its utilization
promises predictability of overall transportation costs, improved control and
coordination of intermodal shipments, and rate reductions.[35]
Although containerization has
heretofore had its greatest impact in the maritime industry, an increasing
volume of United States foreign trade is now transported by air. The loading and handling efficiency of
containerized shipments is a natural complement to the speed of air
transportation. New jumbo jets are
capable of handling even the bulky containers, and are therefore able to
provide coordinated movements in conjunction with surface carriers.[36]
Containerization has had a profound
impact, not only upon the technology of transportation and facilitation of
international trade, but also upon the procedures of those governmental
entities charged with regulating and coordinating foreign commerce
movements. Moreover, its full potential
has not yet been realized. It is
estimated that eighty percent of all general freight cargo in foreign commerce
is containerizable.[37]
With the growth of TOFC operations,[38]
the ICC acquired some measure of regulatory expertise in the coordination of
containerized intermodal shipments.
TOFC transportation, more popularly known as “piggyback” service, is a
bimodal operation involving the movement of commodities, trailers, or
semi-trailers of motor carriers and on the flatcars of rail carriers.[39] Such transportation combines the expeditious
and economically advantages associated with rail transport with the versatility
of motor carriage.[40] The Interstate Commerce Act[41]
authorized the voluntary establishment of just and reasonable through routes
and joint rates,[42] charges and
classifications between motor and rail carriers, or between motor and water
carriers (including FMC regulated ocean carriers transporting commodities
between Alaska and Hawaii and the contiguous forty-eight States). The ICC readily approved such arrangements,
and its regulatory efforts were a substantial contribution to the expansion of
innovative concepts in surface transportation.[43]
The ICC frequently acknowledged that
containerization is a progressive innovation which facilitates the intermodal
coordination of operations and the efficiency and economy of transportation,
and should therefore be encouraged.[44] Thus, where a public need existed which
cannot adequately be satisfied by existing transportation services, authority
was granted for the transportation of empty containers between port cities and
inland points.[45] The grant of authority to transport empty
containers along with loaded containers obviated the necessity of deadheading
containers in return movements to seaports and maximized the efficiency and
economy of such operations by permitting the free transfer of containers from
interior breakbulk to stuffing points.[46] The grant of authority in such circumstances
frequently had the effect of advancing the development of intermodal
maritime-land operations consonant with the Commission’s declared policies.
In
summary, prior to deregulation U.S. economic regulation of transportation in
foreign commerce was divided among three separate regulatory agencies. The ICC had jurisdiction over some 18,000
rail, motor, and water carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders. By far the largest of the three “sister”
agencies, it performed its regulatory responsibilities pursuant to the
Interstate Commerce Act [ICA].[47] The Civil Aeronautics Board regulated
domestic and international direct air carriers (airlines) and indirect air
carriers (e.g., air freight forwarders).[48] Then as now, the Federal Maritime Commission
had jurisdiction over common carriers operating United States and foreign flag
vessels [VOs, or maritime carriers] and non-vessel operators [NVOs, or ocean
freight forwarders].[49] The inevitable legal problems that arose as
a result of this overlapping jurisdiction stimulated quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative activity in each of the three agencies.
Of
these three agencies, the ICC was charged by Congress with a unique statutory
directive to promote the coordination of all modes of transportation, even
those not subject to its jurisdiction.[50] Thus, it was recognized that the development
of a coordinated system of transportation must take precedence over the more
narrow interests of those carriers directly subject to ICC jurisdiction.[51] Similarly, the ICC noted that the public
must have available not only a multiplicity of transport modes from which to
choose, but also a working flexibility that permits an optimum utilization of
each mode of transportation in coordinated through movements.[52] Moreover, the ICC further recognized that it
is in the public interest to adopt regulatory policies that promote the free
flow of international commerce between the United States and its neighbors.[53]
As noted, the ICC developed great
regulatory expertise in intermodal transportation even before the advent of the
“container revolution,” for it had regulated trailer-on-flatcar or “piggy-back”
service for a considerable period. TOFC
essentially involves the bimodal transportation of trailers on rail flatcars
for a portion of a through movement, and the movement of the trailers attached
to the tractors of motor carriers for the remainder thereof.[54]
The ICC frequently acknowledged the
innovative nature of containerization, which permitted the efficient and
economical coordination of intermodal operations.[55] In Zirbel
Transport, Inc., Ext.--Containers[56]
the Commission emphasized, with particularity, the benefits to be derived from
increased employment of containerized operations:
[I]t has always been the policy of this Commission
to encourage the development of intermodal transportation, and we believe that
containerization is a useful, innovative tool in that development. The services proposed in this and other
recent applications offer numerous benefits directly to the shipping
public. Among these benefits are: a reduction in packaging requirements;
increased shipment integrity resulting in a reduction in loss, damage, and
pilferage; less handling and warehousing; avoidance of terminal congestion and
interchange delays; faster transit times; energy conservation; and more
efficient use of equipment. The
bottom-line benefit is, of course, less costly transportation of goods for the
public at large.[57]
Similarly,
in AAA Transfer, Inc., Ext. – Cargo
Containers,[58] the ICC
recognized the following characteristics of containerized transportation:
The benefits to be derived from the utilization of
intermodal transportation of freight in containers include reduced (1) costs,
(2) transit time, (3) in-transit damage to lading, (4) difficulty in affixing
responsibility for loss and damage, and (5) incidence of components becoming
separated from concurrently shipped base commodities. Successful containership service depends to a substantial degree
upon rapid operation of vessels between ports and concomitantly, reduction of
the time consumed in port for unloading and loading cargo. Containerships now generally call only at
the largest of ports, and often hundreds of containers are unloaded at one time
from a single vessel. Offloaded
containers must promptly be removed from the port facilities, and arriving
containers must be delivered according to the water carrier’s loading schedule
if they are to make the intended sailing.
Coordination of movements is also required in the repositioning of empty
containers and of chassis and flat-bed trailers. In addition, certain receivers of freight require timed pickups
or deliveries in order to facilitate the unloading or loading of shipments and
to prevent disruption of plant production.
Without expeditious motor common carrier service the full potential
benefits of intermodal containerized freight service cannot be realized.[59]
This regulatory philosophy facilitated a tremendous
increase in the employment of containers in through intermodal carriage. Moreover, the ICC explicitly emphasized its
policy of promoting containerization, intermodal coordination, and cooperation
in transportation.[60] Operating authority was granted for the
movement of empty containers between port facilities and inland points,[61]
thus maximizing efficiency by permitting the freer transfer of containers
between break-bulk and stuffing points.
Authority was not required for the return movement of empty containers
to the point of origin when the containers have been utilized in authorized
outbound transportation.[62] Operating authority was required, however,
for the transportation of empty containers to a point other than the origin of
the initial loaded container shipment.[63]
FOREIGN COMMERCE REGULATION
AND THE LAND BRIDGE EXEMPTION
Pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Act,[64]
the ICC had jurisdiction over the transportation of passengers and property by
motor carriers engaged in foreign commerce.
Foreign commerce was defined by section 203(a)(11) of the ICA as
Commerce, whether such commerce moves wholly by
motor vehicle, or partly by motor vehicle and partly by rail, express, or
water, (A) between any place in the United States and any place in a foreign
country, or between places in the United States through a foreign country; or
(B) between any place in the United States and any place in a Territory or
possession of the United States insofar as such transportation takes place
within the United States.[65]
This statutory definition created the land bridge
exemption, which exempted commerce moving from a foreign country in a
continuous movement through the United States to another foreign country from
economic regulation by the ICC.[66] For example, commodities originating in
London and destined for Toronto could be transported from the port of New York
to points on the international boundary line between the United States and
Canada as an exempt motor carrier movement.
The exemption might also encompass a much more lengthy segment of
surface transportation. Thus, for
example, commodities manufactured in Hong Kong might be transported by an FMC
regulated ocean vessel to Oakland, thence across the United States by motor
carrier to Norfolk in an unregulated exempt movement, and then by FMC carrier
to Rotterdam.
The land bridge exemption was
consistent with article V of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade [GATT],[67]
which provides, inter alia, that “[t]here shall be freedom of transit through
the territory of each contracting party, via the routes most convenient for
international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other
contracting parties.” The exemption was
also alluded to in most treatise of friendship, commerce, and navigation [FCN],
into which the United States has entered with numerous nations. The FCN treaty between the United States and
Japan,[68]
for example, includes the typical provision regarding freedom of transit. Article XX provided:
There shall be freedom of transit through the
territories of each Party by the routes most convenient for international
transit . . . for products of any
origin en route to or from the territories of such other party. Such persons and things in transit . . .
shall be free from unnecessary delays and restrictions.[69]
INTERMODAL MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS
The Interstate Commerce Commission authorized
numerous intermodal acquisitions[70]
that have created integrated transportation companies.[71]
Acquisitions
of Motor Carriers. The Interstate Commerce Act
stated that the ICC “may approve…[a rail application to acquire a motor
carrier] only if it found that the transaction was consistent with the public
interest, would enable the rail carrier to use motor carrier transportation to
public advantage in its operations, and would not unreasonably restrain
competition.”1 Traditionally, the ICC interpreted this
provision to allow only the acquisition of motor carriers providing operations
“auxiliary and supplemental” to rail services, and not to authorize the
approval of a motor carrier having unrestricted operating rights in the absence
of “special circumstances.”2
Hence, the ICC traditionally viewed the Interstate
Commerce Act as
permitting
rail carriers to hold non-rail-related motor carrier operating authority only
when warranted by compelling public need for service not offered by existing
motor carriers.3 The purpose of Congress’ general prohibition
on dual authority, as upheld by the Supreme Court,4 was to protect motor carriers from
domination by their more powerful competitors, the railroads.5
As the ICC explained: “The main purpose for the policy…was to prevent
the railroads from acquiring motor operations through affiliates and using them
in such an manner as to unduly restrain competition of independently operated
motor carriers.”6
In 1982, the ICC abandoned the
special circumstances doctrine in the issuance of unrestricted operating
authority to motor carrier subsidiaries of railroads.7
In 1983, the Denver & Rio Grande became the first rail carrier to
receive unrestricted operating rights for its trucking subsidiary.8
In 1986, Burlington Northern, Inc., a railroad holding company, received
ICC approval to acquire six motor carriers.9 That same year, the ICC approved the
Norfolk/Southern Railway’s $370 million acquisition of North American Van
Lines, the nation’s largest household goods carrier.10 In 1986, Union Pacific Corporation
announced an agreement to acquire the nation’s fifth largest motor carrier, Overnite
Transportation Co., for $1.2 billion.11
In an important opinion rendered in
the fall of 1986, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. ICC (Teamsters I),12 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held the ICC’s
eradication of the special circumstances doctrine inconsistent with the
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act governing rail acquisition of motor
carriers.13 The Act imposed a tripartite test upon such
transactions: (1) they must be in the “public interest”; (2) they must “enable
the rail carriers to use motor carrier transportation to public advantage in
its operations”; (3) they must “not unreasonably restrain competition.”14
The second prong of that test led the court to remand the ICC’s approval
of Norfolk/Southern’s acquisition of North American Van Lines.15
Applying the methodology announced
earlier by the Supreme Court in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,16 the District of Columbia Circuit found
the first and third criteria sufficiently ambiguous that it could rely on the
ICC’s interpretation.17 However, the court deemed the second
criterion precise enough to reflect a clear congressional intent regarding the
question at issue: that “rail carriers…be allowed to acquire only motor
carriers that would be useful in rail operations.”17
In its 1984 policy statement, the ICC had erroneously concluded that the
statutory requirement would be satisfied if the acquired motor carriers would
be used in its “overall transportation operations.”17
Because many of North American’s operations were, and would continue to
be, unrelated to supplementing rail services, the rail acquisition violated the
statute’s requirement that railroads may acquire motor carriers only for
purposes of improving rail operations.18
After remand, a curious rider was
attached to anti-drug legislation in the closing days of the ninety-ninth
Congress. The rider effectively
grandfathered approval of any acquisition of a motor carrier by a railroad
agreed to before the District of Columbia Circuit’s opinion in Teamsters I.19 Apparently the several railroads that
had such acquisitions pending utilized their political power to open the window
wide enough for them to pass through.
Shortly thereafter, the ICC sought
withdrawal of the Teamsters I opinion
on grounds that the legislation had turned it into a mere advisory opinion, the
acquisition issue was moot, and the question was nonjusticiable. In International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States (Teamsters II),20 the court declined to withdraw its
prior opinion, on grounds that there were other unresolved issues appropriate
for remand. But in light of the
supervening legislation, it reversed those portions of its decision relevant to
section 11344 (c).21 Nonetheless, the two decisions appear to
revive the “special circumstances” doctrine, at least for rail acquisition not
shielded by the 1987 anti-drug legislation.22
Acquisitions
of Water Carriers. Two sections of the Interstate
Commerce Act governed ICC jurisdiction over rail acquisitions of water
carriers. The first was the general
provision applicable to all mergers or acquisitions of control not involving
two class I railroads. The ICC was
required to approve the transaction unless it concluded that:
1.
As
a result of the transaction, there is likely to be a substantial lessening of
competition, creation of a monopoly, or restraint of trade in freight surface
transportation in any region of the United States: and
2.
the
anticompetitive effects of the transaction outweigh the public interest in
meeting significant transportation needs.23
The second section was more specifically directed to
water carrier acquisitions. No carrier
could acquire a competing water carrier unless, with respect to carriers that
do not operate via the Panama Canal, the ICC concluded that such acquisition
“will still allow that water common carrier or vessel to be operated in the
public interest advantageously to interstate commerce and that it will still
allow competition, without reduction, on the water route in question.”24
In 1984, the ICC approved CSX’s $725 million acquisition of American Commercial Lines, Inc., which had as a subsidiary the nation’s largest inland water carrier, notwithstanding the fact that there was extensive intermodal competition between the two.25 In June of 1986, CSX acquired Sea-Land Corporation for $800 million.
EXEMPTIONS
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 conferred broad
exemption authority upon the Interstate Commerce Commission. Commodities and services that have been
exempted include all traffic moving in boxcars or in "piggyback"
(trailer-on-flatcar/container-on-flatcar, or TOFC/COFC) service, [72] and a long list of individual commodities,
such as motor vehicles, fresh fruits and vegetables, lumber, furniture, poultry
and meats, butter and cheese, sand and gravel, and most manufactured products.[73] Thus, intrastate movements made by an
Interstate railroad on railroad-owned trucks have been exempted from
regulation.[74] The Commission also extended its approval of
an agreement among various rail carriers for the pooling of intermodal cars.[75] However, the Congress has denied the STB
authority to exempt carriers from the
intermodal ownership prohibitions, from “full liability” terms in cargo loss
and damage, or from labor protection obligations in line sales, mergers or
acquisitions.[76]
RATE REGULATION
The
existence of intermodal competition became an important threshold factor in
determining whether the ICC would exert regulatory oversight of railroad
rates. The Staggers Rail Act of 1980
reduced the ICC’s jurisdiction over rates significantly by providing that the
Commission had jurisdiction over them only if the traffic was “market dominant”
and the proposed rates were more than 170% of variable costs.[77] Railroads were free to raise or lower rates
at well unless, with respect to an increase, the carrier had market dominance
over the traffic, or with respect to a decrease, the rates would be lowered
below a “reasonable minimum” (if the rate was above the variable costs of
providing the service, it was conclusively presumed to contribute to “going
concern value” and therefore be above a reasonable minimum). Staggers also frees railroads to enter into
contracts with shippers covering rates and levels of service.
The ICC defined “market dominance” in such a way
that it was rarely deemed to exist.
According to the Commission’s interpretation, it did not exist if there
was intermodal competition, intramodal competition, product competition, or
geographic competition.[78]
The Commission also took the position that carriers should be
generally free to raise rates until they either become “revenue adequate” or
“stand alone costs” are achieved.[79] Stand alone costs are essentially what it
might cost an electric utility, for example, to lay its own rail line to a coal
mine. The net result was that, in the
vast majority of cases, shippers could obtain no relief from what they believed
were onerous rail rates.[80] Producers of coal and electric utilities
called for legislative relief from this administrative deregulation or, failing
that, a sunset of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
SUNSET OF THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION; EMERGENCE OF THE SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD
Several pieces of legislation whittled away at the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, ultimately leading to its
sunset. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980,
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, and the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, all
diminished the ICC's jurisdiction. The
Surface Freight Forwarder Deregulation Act of 1986 deregulated freight
forwarders other than those handling household goods. Freight forwarders are central to many intermodal movements. The Negotiated Rates Act of 1993 [NRA]
addressed problems arising out of outdated regulatory requirements in the
trucking industry. The Trucking
Industry Regulatory Reform Act of 1994 [TIRRA] further reduced Federal
regulation of the trucking industry.
Moreover, TIRRA expanded the ICC's exemption authority to embrace many
aspects of trucking regulation. The ICC
Termination Act of 1996 sunset the Interstate Commerce Commission, deregulated
and amended certain functions, and transferred jurisdiction over rail, motor,
bus, broker, freight forwarder and pipeline services to the newly created Surface
Transportation Board [STB] and the DOT office of Motor Carrier Information
analysis [MCIA]. The STB is a
three-member quasi-independent panel within the U.S. Department of
Transportation. The MCIA was a part of
the DOT’s Federal Highway Administration.
Jurisdiction over railroads and pipelines is now vested in the STB. Jurisdiction over motor carriers, water
carriers, brokers and freight forwarders is now vested in the Secretary of
Transportation.
CREATION OF THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Discussions about creating a Federal
Department of Transportation [DOT] began as early as 1940.[81] In the 1960s, the Landis Report[82]
cited the need for an office to coordinate and develop a national
transportation policy. In 1961, the
Doyle Report recommended not only creation of a Department of Transportation
but also the merger of all transportation regulatory functions into a unified,
fully intermodal regulatory body.[83] This led President Kennedy to ask his aides
to offer suggestions concerning transport policy. Legislation passed by Kennedy in 1961 provided the first Federal
program of urban transit support.[84] With Kennedy’s assassination, the task force
on transportation advised President Lyndon Johnson that no focal point for
transportation existed in the Executive Branch, and that therefore a
cabinet-level Department of Transportation should be created.[85] The bill creating the DOT was signed on
October 15, 1966, and the agency was established on April 1, 1967, with Alan S.
Boyd as the first Secretary of Transportation.[86]
The DOT essentially was created from
an amalgamation of several pre-existing governmental agencies. From the Interstate Commerce Commission was
transferred the Bureau of Railroad Safety (which formed a part of the Federal
Railroad Administration [FRA]), and the Bureau of Vehicle Safety (which formed
a part of the Federal Highway Administration [FHWA]). The independent Federal Aviation Agency (which had earlier been
split off from the Civil Aeronautics Board) became DOT’s Federal Aviation
Administration. The Commerce Department
gave DOT the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, surrendered to the
FHWA the National Highway Safety Bureau, and gave the FRA the Office of
Groundspeed Transportation. The Treasury Department gave it the Coast
Guard. The Department of Interior gave
the FRA the Alaska Railroad. A new
quasi-independent agency, the National Transportation Safety Board, was also
housed within DOT.[87]
III. INTERMODAL TRANSPORT LAW: WHAT IT IS
THE INTERMODAL
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY ACT OF 1991
As noted above, in the Transportation Act of 1940,
Congress set forth a Statement of national transportation policy, which
included an obligation that the Interstate Commerce Commission [ICC] (which
regulated the surface modes of transportation) shall “provide for a fair and
impartial regulation of all modes of transportation . . . all to the end of
developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by
water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of
the commerce of the United States . . . .”[88] Though Congress would embrace intermodal
facilitation as an important policy goal in several subsequent legislative
acts, several decades would pass before intermodalism would take center stage
in national policy.[89]
As the Interstate Highway System
neared completion in the early 1990s, the focus in transportation priorities
shifted away from new highway construction.
Congressional attention turned instead to alternatives to the single-occupancy
vehicle [SOV] to satiate the public’s desire for mobility. Concerns over congestion, sprawl and
pollution, all of which defied political jurisdictional boundaries, emerged as
political issues. Congress also
recognized that the separate and isolated modal networks were not linked
together well. Seamless connectivity
between modes might well allow Americans to enjoy the inherent advantages of
all modes.
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
of 1991 [ISTEA] established new national priorities in areas of economic
progress, cleaner air, energy conservation and social equity, requiring that
the intermodal transportation system be “economically efficient and
environmentally sound . . .” as well as “energy efficient . . . .”[90] In the legislation, Congress declared that
it is in the “national interest to encourage and promote the development of
transportation systems embracing various modes of transportation in a manner
which will efficiently maximize mobility of people and goods within and through
urbanized areas and minimize transportation-related fuel consumption and air
pollution.”[91]
Significantly, the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 was the first highway bill in the
nation’s history to have expunged the word “highway” from its title. This legislation provided enhanced
flexibility for State and local governments to redirect highway funds to
accommodate other modes and modal connections.[92] In ISTEA’s legislative history, Congress
concluded:
An intermodal transportation system . . . to enhance
efficiency will be the key to meeting the economic, energy and environmental
challenges of the coming decades. The
nation will not be able to meet all of those demands through continued reliance
on separate, isolated modes of transportation.
Development of an intermodal transportation system
will result in increased productivity growth the nation needs to compete in the
global economy of the 21st Century. We
can no longer rely on a transportation system designed for the 1950s to provide
the support for American industry to compete in the international marketplace.[93]
By placing the word “intermodal” (as opposed to the
historical “highway” term) in the title
of the bill, Congress sought “to bring the need for intermodalism to the
forefront of the nation’s transportation and economic debate.[94] ISTEA authorized $156 billion for fiscal
years 1992-1997, but not just for highways.
It shifted Federal transportation policy from traditional highway
funding for automobiles to a system which creates intermodal systems that
include highways, rail and mass transit in a comprehensive system, with
seamless connectivity between modes.[95] ISTEA enhanced State and local governmental
flexibility in redirecting highway funds to accommodate other modes and pay for
transit and carpool projects, as well as bicycle and pedestrian facilities,
research and development, and wetland loss mitigation.[96] It created flexible guidelines that cut
across traditional boundaries in allowing expenditures on highways, transit and
non-traditional areas (e.g., vehicle emission inspection and maintenance).[97] According to DOT, “This flexibility will
help State and local officials to choose the best mix of projects to address
air quality without being influenced by rigid Federal funding categories or
different matching ratios that favor one mode over the other.”[98]
ISTEA discouraged continued reliance on the
automobile and expanded highways while encouraging the seamless movement of
people and goods between modes of transportation.[99] For example, the Federal match for new or
expanded facilities to be available for single-occupancy vehicles is reduced to
75% (compared with an 80% Federal match on other highway projects).[100] The transit match is increased to 80% to
achieve parity in matching ratios between the modes.[101]
ISTEA also gave Metropolitan Planning Organizations
[MPOs] expanded funding for planning purposes and authority to select projects
for funding, thereby significantly expanding their jurisdiction by authorizing
MPOs to allocate Federal highway funds.
Under ISTEA, the MPO, in consultation with the State, selects all
Federal highway, transit and alternative transportation projects to be
implemented within its boundaries, except for projects undertaken on the
National Highway System and pursuant to the Bridge and Interstate Maintenance
programs. Projects on the National
Highway System and pursuant to the Bridge and Interstate Maintenance Program
are selected by the State in cooperation with the MPO. ISTEA also required MPOs to “begin serious,
formal transportation planning”, and to “fiscally constrain” their long-range
plans and short-term Transportation Improvement Programs [TIPs], requiring MPOs
to create realistic, multi-year agendas of projects which could be completed
with available funds.[102] An opportunity for public comment must be
provided in preparation of both the long-rang plan and the TIP.[103] Prepared in cooperation with the State and
the local transit operator, and updated every two years, TIPs must include all
projects in the metro area to be funded under a Title 23[104]
and the Federal Transit Act, and be consistent with the long-range plan and the
Statewide Transportation Improvement Program [STIP]. The STIP usually covers a time frame of about three years and
describes specific projects or project segments, as well as their scope and
estimated cost. States must also
prepare a long-range transportation plan which identifies the State’s
transportation needs and proposed projects over a period of 20 years.[105] Under ISTEA, the MPO’s planning process, at
minimum, had to consider the following factors:
· efficient use of existing transportation facilities
· energy conservation goals;
· methods to reduce and prevent traffic congestion;
· effect on land use and land development;
· programming of expenditures for transportation enhancement
activities;
· effects of all transportation projects regardless of sources of
funds;
· international border crossings and access to major traffic
generators such as ports, airports,
intermodal transportation facilities, and major freight distribution
routes;
· connectivity of roads within the metropolitan area with roads
outside the metropolitan area;
· transportation needs identified by management systems;
· preservation of transportation corridors;
· methods to enhance efficient movement of commercial vehicles;
· life cycle costs in design and engineering of bridges, tunnels,
and pavement;
social, economic and environmental effects.[106]
The
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century of 1998 [TEA-21][107]
reaffirms and retains the planning provisions and MPO structure of ISTEA, with
its emphasis on Federal-State-local cooperation and pubic participation, though
significant changes were made in funding levels.[108]
TEA-21 replaced ISTEA’s fifteen factors to be considered in TIP preparation
with seven:
1.
Support
the economic vitality of the metropolitan area, particularly by enhancing
global competitiveness, productivity, and efficiency;
2.
Increase
the safety and security of the transportation system for motorized and
nonmotorized users;
3.
Increase
the accessibility and mobility options available to people and freight;
4.
Protect
and enhance the environment, promote energy conservation, and improve the
quality of life;
5.
Enhance the integration and
connectivity of the transportation system, across and between modes, for people
and freight;
6.
Promote
efficient system management and operation; and
7.
Emphasize
the preservation of the existing system.[109]
Congress has declared that among the
transportation policies of the United States is “to encourage and promote
development of a national intermodal transportation system . . . to move people
and goods in an energy-efficient manner, provide the foundation for improved productivity
growth, strengthen the Nation’s ability to compete in the global economy, and
obtain the optimum yield from the Nation’s transportation resources.” [110] Congress created the U.S. Department of
Transportation to “make easier the development and improvement of coordinated
transportation service . . . .”[111] The Secretary of Transportation is required
to coordinate Federal policy on intermodal transportation, and promote creation
and maintenance of an efficient U.S. intermodal transportation system.[112] He is also obliged to consult with the heads
of other Federal agencies to establish policies “consistent with maintaining a
coordinated transportation system . . . .”[113] The Secretary is required to "encourage
the development and use of intermodal transport, using containers constructed
to facilitate economical, safe, and expeditious handling of containerized cargo
without intermediate reloading which such cargo is transported over land, air
and sea areas."[114]
Among the aviation statutes is a
recognition that it is the policy of the United States "to develop a
national intermodal transportation system that transports passengers and
property in an efficient manner."[115] Congress has declared that "A national
intermodal transportation system is a coordinated, flexible network of diverse
but complimentary forms of transportation that transportat passengers and
property in the most efficient manner.
By reducing transportation costs, these intermodal systems will enhance the
ability of the industry of the United States to compete in the global
marketplace."[116] Further, Congress has recognized that,
"An intermodal transportation system consists of transportation hubs that
connect different forms of appropriate transportation and provides users with
the most efficient means of transportation and with access to commercial
centers, business locations, population centers, and the vast rural areas of
the United States, as well as providing links to other forms of transportation
and intercity connections."[117] The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act for the 21st Century amended this provision to provide
for the encouragement and development "of intermodal connections on
airport property between aeronautical and other transportation modes to serve
air transportation passengers and cargo efficiently and effectively and promote
economic development."[118] Congress also has decided that the U.S.
"must make a national commitment to rebuild its infrastructure through
development of a national intermodal transportation system."[119]
In ISTEA, Congress set forth a
detailed national policy to establish a National Intermodal Transportation
System “that is economically efficient and environmentally sound, provides the
foundation for the United States to compete in the global economy, and will
move individuals and property in an energy efficient way.”[120] The National Intermodal Transportation
System shall:
·
“consist
of all forms of transportation in a unified, interconnected manner . . . to
reduce energy consumption and air pollution while promoting economic
development and supporting the United States’ preeminent position in
international commerce”;[121]
·
include
the Interstate highway system and the principal arterial roads;[122]
·
include
public transportation;[123]
·
provide
improved access to seaports and airports;[124]
·
give
special emphasis to the role of transportation in increasing productivity
growth;[125]
·
give
“increased attention to the concepts of innovation, competition, energy
efficiency, productivity, growth and accountability”;[126]
·
be
adapted to new technologies wherever feasible and economical, giving special
emphasis to safety considerations;[127]
and
·
be
the centerpiece of a national investment commitment to create new national
wealth.[128]
All DOT employees are required to be given a copy of
the National Intermodal Transportation System Policy, and it is required to be
posted prominently in all offices of the Department.[129]
In the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997,
Congress declared that “intercity rail passenger service is an essential component
of a national intermodal passenger transportation system” and that Amtrak and
intercity bus providers should work together to “develop coordinated intermodal
relationships promoting seamless transportation services which enhance travel
options and increase operating efficiencies.”[130]
Congressional policies governing the Surface
Transportation Board require that it “ensure the development, coordination, and
preservation of a transportation system that meets the transportation needs of
the United States . . . .”[131] In overseeing these modes, the STB must
“recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each mode of
transportation”,[132]
and must “promote intermodal transportation.”[133]
The U.S. Postal Service has also been given freedom
to contract with carriers by any mode it deems appropriate for carriage of the
mail.[134]
ISTEA significantly enhanced the role of
Metropolitan Planning Organizations [MPOs] in transportation planning by giving
the larger MPOs[135]
principal authority to select projects for certain “pots” of Federal money in
consultation with the State, while requiring the State to cooperate with the
MPO on allocating Federal money in those “pots” over which the State had
primary jurisdiction, and the local transit provider to do the same.[136] The MPO has responsibility for allocating
STP-metro, and in some States, CMAQ,[137]
and enhancement (e.g., bicycle, pedestrian) funds in “consultation” with the
State DOT; the State has jurisdiction over the National Highway System, Bridge,
and Interstate Maintenance funds, which it selects in “cooperation” with the
MPO. The MPO was required to engage in
formalized planning of two types -- a 20-year long-range plan, and a short-term
Transportation Improvement Program, covering transportation projects to be
implemented over at least a three-year period.[138] The TIP must be updated at least every two
years.
Thus, beginning in 1991, MPOs were
transformed from advisory institutions, into institutions that actually have
direct influence over the distribution of money -- from voluntary planning
organizations, to organizations that have their fingers on some of the purse
strings. In ISTEA, and expanded in
TEA-21, MPOs were empowered with the ability to directly designate projects for
the Federal dollars under their primary jurisdiction. Though the “pots” of Federal money over which the MPOs exercise
jurisdiction are small relative to those controlled by the State, it is clear
that such empowerment over money caused many local jurisdictions to take the
MPO process and their participation therein far more seriously than they had
theretofore.
All this gave transportation
planning a new perspective. The
Interstate and inter-regional “top-down” highway planning process of the
Federal and State governments, respectively, and the localized “bottom-up”
street and road planning process of the cities and counties, would now be
coupled with a third regional process which was a bit of both, expanded beyond
highways, streets and roads into a comprehensive transportation planning
process that took into account all modes, as well as a number of related
social, economic, and environmental issues.
Metropolitan planning organizations are required to
develop transportation systems and facilities “that will function as an
intermodal transportation system for the metropolitan area and as an integral
part of the intermodal transportation system for the State and the United
States.”[139] State plans and programs must do the same.[140] In developing transportation plans, MPOs must
consider several factors, including access to intermodal transportation
facilities.[141] Federal regulations require that the
metropolitan transportation planning process include a long-term transportation
plan addressing at least a 20-year planning horizon including both short- and
long-range strategies leading to the development of an integrated intermodal
system which facilitates the efficient movement of goods and people.[142] The MPO’s long-range plan must include an
identification of transportation facilities, including intermodal facilities,
that should function as an integrated metropolitan transportation system,
emphasizing those facilities that serve important national and regional
transportation functions. Federal
regulations provide that MPO boundaries shall, at minimum, include the UZA(s)
and contiguous geographic area(s) likely to become urbanized within the 20-year
forecast period covered by the transportation plan. Before determining the MPO’s boundaries, the planning areas in
use for all transport modes shall be reviewed, and adjustments made to foster
an effective planning process that assures intermodal connectivity, reduces
modal disadvantages, and promotes efficient transportation investment
strategies.[143] The content of the plans and programs for
each metropolitan area must provide for the development, integration, and
management of all forms of transportation, allowing the metropolitan
transportation system to function as an integral part of an intermodal
transportation system serving the metropolitan area, the State, and the United
States.[144]
The States’ long-range 20-year transportation plan
must provide for the development and implementation of the intermodal
transportation system of the State.[145] The Secretary of Transportation shall make
grants to the States to develop model State intermodal transportation plans,
which shall include systems for collecting data related to intermodal
transportation.[146] States are required to 2% of Federal highway
appropriations to planning and research of, inter alia, “highway, public
transportation, and intermodal transportation systems.”[147] Emphasizing the importance of highway,
public transport and intermodal systems, Congress mandated that not less than
25% of such funds shall be expended by the State shall be devoted to research
and development of these systems.[148] In ISTEA, Congress also required DOT to
promulgate regulation for State development, establishment and implementation
of a system for managing its intermodal transportation facilities and systems.[149]
A State's intermodal management system "shall provide for improvement and
integration of all of a State's transportation systems and shall include
methods of achieving the optimum yield from such systems, methods for
increasing productivity in the State, methods for increasing use of advanced
technologies, and methods to encourage the use of innovative marketing
techniques, such as just-in-time deliveries.[150]
The Secretary of Defense is required
to ensure that all of the Department of Defenses’s studies and reports
concerning sealift and related intermodal transportation requirements take into
account the full range of
transportation and distribution resources available to U.S.-flag merchant
vessels.[151] Emergency Preparedness statutes and
Executive Orders issued thereunder require the Secretary of Transportation to
be prepared to provide direction to all modes of transport in national security
emergencies, including intermodal transportation systems.[152] Working with the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Transportation is required to establish an Emergency Preparedness
Program. The transportation resources
to be made available thereunder include “intermodal systems and equipment”, as
well as “intermodal and management services”.[153]
The National Highway System is required to “serve
major population centers, international border crossings, ports, airports,
public transportation facilities, and other intermodal transportation
facilities . . . .”[154] Intermodal surface freight transfer
facilities, other than seaports or airports, which are located on or adjacent
to the National Highway System or connections thereto are explicitly eligible
for Federal funding.[155]
Equipment or a facility for an
intermodal transfer facility is explicitly included within the term “capital
project” for which Federal money may be spent for mass transportation.[156]
ISTEA allocated resources for Federal funding of up to 80% of at least
three demonstration projects for conversion of rail passenger terminals into
intermodal transportation terminals.[157] To be eligible for Federal funding, such
facilities needed to include, as appropriate, facilities to handle motorbus
transportation, mass transit, and airline ticket offices and passenger terminals
providing direct access to area airports.[158] The Secretary is also instructed to
encourage various governmental and private institutions to develop plans to
convert rail passenger terminals into intermodal transportation terminals.[159] Grants may also be made to preserve an
existing rail terminal may also be made if such facilities are reasonable
capable of conversion to intermodal facilities.[160] DOT may provide financial assistance to
States seeking to build rail intermodal freight terminals.[161] Loans and loan guarantees may be made by DOT
to finance the acquisition, improvement, rehabilitation, development or
establishment of intermodal equipment or facilities,[162]
or to preserve or enhance intermodal service to small communities or rural
areas.[163]
DOT may provide up to 50% of the costs incurred by a
public agency for high-speed rail corridor planning.[164] Among the eligible corridor planning
activities are intermodal terminals.[165] Amtrak was given eminent domain power to
build an intermodal transportation terminal at Washington, D.C.'s Union
Station.[166]
The Federal Aviation Act requires
that public airports accepting AIP funding agree that all revenue generated by
the airport be used exclusively for the capital or operating costs of the
airport, the local airport system, or facilities owned or operated by the
airport directly and substantially related to the air transportation of persons
or property.[167] The question has arisen whether airport
funds spent on building or operating transit or rail lines or stations are to
be owned or operated by the airport and directly and substantially related to
the air transportation of passengers.
Federal Aviation Administration
regulations provide that airport access projects must preserve or enhance the
capacity, safety or security of the national air transportation system, reduce
noise, or provide an opportunity for enhanced competition between carriers.[168] Such projects must also be for exclusive use
of the airport patrons and employees, be constructed on airport-owned land or rights
of way, and be connected to the nearest public access of sufficient capacity.[169] The Federal Aviation Administration [FAA]
insisted that AIP funds be limited to landside expenditures, “which encompasses
the area from the airport boundary where the general public enters the airport
property to the point where the public leaves the terminal building to board
the aircraft. Typical eligible landside
development items include such things as terminal buildings, entrance roadways
and pedestrian walkways.”[170]
As we shall see, more recent
interpretations by the FAA have liberalized this rather constricted view of the
types of landside projects which are appropriate for Federal airport funding.
In 1996, the FAA approved the
request of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to use PFC funds to
extend Newark Airport’s light-rail line 4,400 feet to an Amtrak/New Jersey
Transit station off airport grounds.[171] Among the largest intermodal projects
approved by the FAA for PFC funding was in 1998 for a $1.5 billion rail line
linking New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport with the Long Island
Rail Road and the E, J and Z subway lines to Manhattan at Jamaica Station, and
to Howard Beach.[172] The FAA concluded that PFC expenditures on
the JFK rail link would satisfy the statutory and regulatory requirements by
alleviating ground congestion on airport roadways and terminal frontages, by
enhancing the efficient movement of airport employees, by freeing up capacity
on the roadways for additional passengers, and by improving the airport’s
connection to the regional transportation network. It found, “Where ground access is shown to be a limiting factor
to an airport’s growth, a project to enhance ground access may qualify as
preserving or enhancing capacity of the national air transportation system.”[173] The FAA found that the rail line would
enable an additional 3.35 million passengers to use JFK annually by the year
2013, and “therefore must be construed to have a substantial capacity
enhancement effect on JFK, as measured in air passengers accommodated by the
airport.”[174] The FAA concluded that the rail link would
“serve to preserve or enhance the capacity of JFK and the national air
transportation system . . . .”[175] The $3 per ticket Passenger Facility Charge
would generate about $45-50 million a year, enabling the airport to pay off the
cost of the line in 20 years.[176]
Rail lines at Atlanta, Chicago,
Cleveland and Washington, D.C., have been financed by transit systems rather
than airports. The ISTEA legislation included
a special appropriation for extension of the Bay Area Rapid Transit System
[BART] to San Francisco International Airport [SFO]. The Federal Transit Administration committed $750 million, or
about 64% of the $1.2 billion project.
The remaining $417 will come from State and local funding sources.[177] The FAA approved airport funding for
construction of a BART station at SFO.[178] The 8.7-mile extension, the largest since
BART was built in the early 1970s, will have four stations. About 68,000 riders a day are expected to
use the line when it opens in 2001.[179]
The Federal Transit Administration
has also committed to contribute 72% of the construction costs of the $399
million extension of the St. Louis Metrolink to Mid-America Airport in St.
Clair County, Illinois. This light rail
system already connects to St. Louis Lambert International Airport.[180]
The ISTEA legislation provided for
flexible funding (up to $70 billion of Federal highway funds and $10 billion of
Federal transit funds over six years) to support multimodal planning and
project development. Though only $6
million was transferred from the highway trust funds to transit in the year
preceding promulgation of ISTEA, by 1995, more than $802 million was being
transferred annually.[181] Flexible funding allowed the various
Federal, State and local transportation units to coordinate development of the
Miami Intermodal Center, for example, which seeks to facilitate seamless
passenger connections between air, rail, bus and ferry modes.[182]
The Federal Highway Administration
is financing 80% of the $11.6 billion 7.5-mile highway/tunnel extension of the
Interstate highway link to Boston Logan International Airport.[183] Federal and State highway departments have
partnered successfully with airport authorities to connect road networks with
airports at many cities, including Las Vegas and Pittsburgh. More than $300 million in PFC funding was
approved for building an access road and tunnel at Las Vegas McCarran
International Airport, while National Highway System funds were used to
construct the highways outside the airport property.[184]
In summary, Federal funding of an
airport with the surrounding highway, rail or transit networks can come from
the FAA, FHWA, or the FTA. ISTEA’s
effort to foster more cooperation between these agencies has had limited, but
significant, success.
The President of the United States
is authorized to provide financial assistance to the independent States of the
former Soviet Union, inter alia, for “improving intermodal transportation systems
for the safe and efficient movement of people, products and materials.”[185]
Developing partnerships with public and private
sectors, the Secretary of Transportation must develop an advance research
program that shows the potential benefits for improving the durability,
efficiency, environmental impact, productivity and safety of the intermodal
transportation system.[186]
The coordination of U.S. government research on
intermodal transportation is to be done by the Director of the DOT Office of
Intermodalism. He is also required to
provide technical assistance to States and MPOs in collecting data related to
intermodal transportation.[187] The Secretary of Transportation may also
give the Administrator of the DOT's Research and Special Programs
Administration additional duties, "including such multimodal and
intermodal duties as are appropriate."[188]
The DOT’s Bureau of Transportation
Statistics is required to compile a comprehensive set of statistics suitable
for conducting cost-benefit studies, including comparisons of individual
transport modes and intermodal transportation systems.[189] DOT is required to assess the relative
efficiency of the various modes of transportation.[190] The Bureau must establish and maintain an
intermodal transportation data base which includes information on the volume
and pattern on the movement of people by all modes and intermodal combinations,
information on the location and connectivity of transportation facilities and
services, and expenditures and capital stocks of each mode and intermodal
combinations.[191] The data bases prepared by the Bureau must
be able to support intermodal network analysis.[192]
Under Chapter 55 “Intermodal
Transportation”, of Title 49, Congress created several University
transportation research centers. Among
the requirements for selection are the recipient’s “establishment of a surface
transportation program encompassing several modes of transportation.”[193] Among the centers created by TEA-21 was the
National Center for Intermodal Transportation, a cooperative venture of the
University of Denver and Mississippi State University.[194]
Several specific intermodal studies have been
required by Congress:
·
The
DOT Secretary is required to investigate railroad spurs and switches which
connect with water terminals in order to develop the types most appropriate for
transferring passengers and property between rail and water carriers more
expeditiously and economically, and to investigate inland water carriers to
determine the extent to which they are interchanging traffic with railroads.[195]
·
In
granting research and development contracts on maglev or high-speed rail
technology, the Secretary must consider the extent to which a proposal includes
the “integration of high-speed ground transportation with other modes of transportation.[196]
·
In
its advanced vehicle technologies program, the Secretary is to encourage and
promote the research, development and deployment of technologies that will use
technological advances in multimodal vehicles.[197]
·
Within
60 days of promulgation of ISTEA in 1991, the Secretary of Transportation was
required to commission a study by the National Academy of Public Administration
to study options for organizing DOT to improve intermodal coordination among
surface-related agencies.[198]
·
Congress
also mandated a study assessing existing data and data collection needs with
respect to the movement of loaded containers and trailers in intermodal
transportation in violation of Federal and State vehicle weight laws, and how
those intermodal movements compare with other overweight domestic highway
freight movements.[199]
·
Within
180 days after promulgation of the National Highway System Designation Act of
1995, the Secretary of Transportation was required to submit modifications to
the National Highway System proposed by a State that consist of connectors to
major ports, airports, international border crossings, public transit
facilities, Interstate bus terminals, and rail and other intermodal
transportation facilities.[200]
·
Within
two years of the enactment of the requirement for an intermodal freight
connectors study in 1998,[201]
the Secretary of Transportation was to have reviewed the conditions of
connectors in the National Highway System that serve airports, seaports and
other intermodal freight facilities designed to facilitate the efficient
movement of freight between transport modes, to identify impediments to
improving connectors serving intermodal facilities, and make recommendations
for improvement thereof.
·
The
Secretary is also directed to conduct a comprehensive program to accelerate the
integration of intelligent transportation systems, funding projects, inter
alia, that will serve as models to
improve and increase the flow of intermodal travel at ports of entry.[202]
·
Research
on automotive propulsion also focuses on “intermodal adaptability”, defined as
the characteristics of an automobile which enable it to be operated or carried
by or on an alternative mode of transportation.[203]
·
The
Secretary is required to evaluate whether modifications should be made to the
loss and damage provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, and in so doing,
consider international and intermodal harmony.[204]
·
A
comprehensive study on waterway improvements by the Army Corps of Engineers
including an appraisal of improvements needed to optimize the system and its
intermodal characteristics.[205]
The Federal Maritime Commission is required to
investigate whether any laws or activities of foreign governments or foreign
carriers providing maritime-related services (including intermodal operations)
in a foreign country adversely affects U.S. carriers in oceanborne trade.[206]
Under the Interstate Commerce Act,
the Surface Transportation Board (formerly the Interstate Commerce Commission)
is authorized to exempt transportation provided by a rail carrier that is part
of a continuous intermodal movement.[207] The term “intermodal” is defined as “of or
relating to the connection between rail service and other modes of
transportation, including all parts of facilities at which such connection is
made.”[208] A “railroad” is defined to include
intermodal equipment used by or in connection with it.[209] Similarly, "maritime-related
services" includes intermodal operations.[210]
The transportation of empty intermodal cargo
containers is specifically exempted from regulation.[211]
One
who tenders an intermodal container in excess of 29,000 pounds is required to
notify the receiver of the gross cargo weight and provide a reasonable
description of its contents.[212] Intermodal freight containers are also included
under the definition of “equipment” in the Geneva Agreement on the
International Carriage of Perishable Foodstuffs and on the Special Equipment to
be used for Such Carriage of 1970.[213] The Secretary of Transportation may make
grants to States to enforce of their commercial motor vehicle size and weight
restrictions at ports where intermodal shipping containers enter or leave the
United States.[214]
The Federal Maritime Commission is
authorized to promulgate rules and regulation affecting shipping in foreign
trade in order deal with conditions unfavorable to its facilitation, including
those in intermodal transportation.[215]
Nothwithstanding any other provision of law
(including the antitrust laws) Amtrak and motor carriers have been freed
"to coordinate schedules, routes, rates, reservations, and ticketing to
provide for enhanced intermodal surface transportation."[216]
IV. INTERMODAL
TRANSPORT LAW: WHAT IT SHOULD BE
ISTEA created a solid foundation on which to build a comprehensive
intermodal system. But more should be
done, particularly in two areas: (1) consolidating governmental functions and
institutions along two broad lines -- passenger and freight; (2) harmonizing
laws among modes, particularly liability and labor laws; and (3) requiring
intermodal planning for all large transportation projects.
All modes of transportation (i.e.,
air, rail, highway, transit, and maritime), and their corresponding Federal
institutions, tend to jealously guard their independent source of
infrastructure financing. The
segregation of funding along modal lines inherently creates institutional
roadblocks to the facilitation of intermodal connections, as the Federal
Aviation Administration seeks to have airport trust funds dedicated to airport
infrastructure, the Federal Highway Administration seeks to have highway trust
funds dedicated to highway construction, and the Federal Transit Administration
seeks to build transit. All three
agencies are subsidiaries of the U.S. Department of Transportation, which
should have the foresight and ability to facilitate seamless transportation
between modes, among the fundamental purposes of the institution as set forth
in its statutory charter. As the
following table reveals, transport infrastructure and regulatory
responsibilities remains fragmented among public and private sectors, and among
federal agencies and Congressional committees:
TRANSPORTATION MODES AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES |
|||
|
REGULATORY FUNCTIONS |
INFRASTRUCTURE OR SERVICE PROVIDER |
||
|
Federal Agency |
Private Sector |
Public Sector |
Federal Agency |
|
Surface
Transportation Board |
Freight
Rail Carriers & Rail Rights of Way |
Rail
Passenger Operations |
Amtrak |
|
Department
of Transportation |
Motor
Carriers |
Highways,
Postal Service |
Federal
Highway Administration, U.S. Postal Service |
|
Department
of Transportation |
Airlines |
Airports,
Small Community Service, Research & Development |
Federal
Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation, National Aeronautics
& Space Administration |
|
|
|
Transit |
Federal
Transit Administration |
|
Federal
Maritime Commission |
Ocean
Carriers |
Sea
Ports |
Army
Corps of Engineers, Federal Maritime Administration |
|
Surface
Transportation Board |
Inland
Water Carriers |
Canals,
Inland Waterways |
Army
Corps of Engineers |
|
Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission |
Pipelines |
|
|
The DOT has estabished a special unit within the
Office of the Secretary to facilitate intermodal connections. Congress in 1991 passed the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act to facilitate intermodal transportation,
requiring the establishment of an Office of Intermodalism within DOT,[217]
as well as an Intermodal Transportation Advisory Board consisting of the
Secretary and the Administrators of the FHWA, FAA, Maritime Administration,
FRA, and FTA.[218] ISTEA also created funding flexibility
enabling more highway dollars to be allocated to non-highway projects. In the Clinton Administration, the
Department created a “One DOT” policy and logo in an effort to better focus the
agency on its central mission – to create a unified, seamless, efficient,
economical and environmentally benign intermodal system.
But creating a unified approach to transportation
issues was among the principal reasons for creation of the DOT in 1966. More than three decades later, it remains
largely an unfulfilled dream.
Jurisdictional turf battles and bureaucratic inertia inevitably inhibit
seamless connections. If DOT is to
fulfill its promise to build a seamless intermodal system, it could begin by
dividing itself into two divisions -- a passenger division, and a freight
division -- for these are more appropriate distinctions than modal
distinctions. Ideally, Congress would
divide its oversight and appropriations committees along similar lines. Undoubtedly, this would require coordination
between the passenger and freight divisions in areas of highway, airport and
rail infrastructure planning and development, so the divisions would have to
work together on these issues. But the
movement of a passenger from an automobile to an airport to a train to a
transit vehicle is an intermodal movement which requires seamlessness; a
container movement from a truck to an ocean vessel, to a rail car, to a truck
requires the same. Unified funding and
planning would encourage the creation of such seamlessness. Moreover, all regulatory functions now held
by DOT, the STB, and the FMC should be consolidated in an independent
Intermodal Transportation Commission so that the legal and regulatory
requirements remain uniform between modes.
THE NEED FOR LEGAL
HARMONIZATION
By definition, intermodal movements involve the movement of passengers
or freight from one mode of transportation to another. Freight can be lost or damaged in
transit. The question then becomes,
what are the legal rules under which liability is assessed? The problem is that the legal rules
governing carrier liability for loss and damage in transit were developed
historically on a mode-by-mode basis.[219]
For example, the Harter Act of 1906
governs domestic water transport; the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (the
domestic equivalent of the 1924 Hague Rules) governs international ocean
transport to or from U.S. ports; the Warsaw Convention of 1929 governs
international air transport; the Carmack Amendment of 1906 governs domestic
rail and motor carriage. Though
liability rules for the latter two modes were relatively harmonious until
promulgation of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,
and the Trucking Industry Regulatory Reform Act of 1994, now the Carmack rules
apply differently between rail and motor carriers. Each of these statutes
imposes different carrier obligations, has different bases of liability,
burdens of proof, limitations of liability, exemptions, defenses, and amounts
recoverable. Carriers’ and shippers’
attorneys vie for the modal regime that most benefits their clients. In circumstances where the identity of the
carrier which caused the damage is at issue, one may find the maritime regime
more favorable, while the other may argue in favor of the rail regime.[220]
The
law can become more complicated still in international transportation. In Europe, international motor carriage is
governed by the Convention on the Contract of International Carriage of Goods
by Road; rail transport is governed by the Convention Concerning the Carriage
of Goods by Rail. A number of countries
have adopted updated versions of the Hague Rules (the Visby or Hamburg Rules);
while others have adopted updated versions of the Warsaw Convention (the Hague
Protocol, or Montreal Convention). The
Multimodal Liability Convention of 1980, which sought to harmonize many of
these laws, has not been widely adopted.
The net result is a legal Tower of
Babel, one which needlessly and wastefully taxes the free flow of
commerce. Congress should promulgate
one unified domestic liability regime for all modes of transport, while the
Executive should attempt to reach a comprehensive unified body of law governing
all modes internationally.
Another area which could use harmonization
is labor law. Railroads and airlines
are governed by the Railway Labor Act.
All other modes of transport are governed by the National Labor
Relations Act. Each has different rules
governing union formation, collective bargaining and dispute resolution, and
different governing boards. For
example, the National Mediation Board regulates railroad and airline
labor-management disputes; unions are organized along craft lines; agreements
continue in effect even after thir expiration date.[221] In contrast, the labor-management relations
of other modes are regulated by the National Labor Relations Board; unions are
organized geographically.[222] Efficiency would be significantly enhanced
if multimodal companies could look to a single set of laws governing labor
issues.
THE NEED FOR INTERMODAL PLANNING IN ALL LARGE TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS
In the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Congress developed a streamlined process for
considering environmental concerns in all major federal projects. In a situation where a federal or
federally-funded activity will significantly affect the quality of the human
environment, an Environmental Impact Statement must be prepared. Comprehensive
federal environmental regulation began with the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969,[223] (signed into law on January 1, 1970), which
established the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], and required that an
environmental assessment [EA], and environmental impact statement [EIS] be
prepared, the latter for any “major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment.” The
EA determines whether potential impacts are significant, explores alternatives
and mitigation measures, and provides essential information as to whether an
EIS must be prepared. The EA focus
attention on potential mitigation measures during the planning process, at a
time when they can be incorporated without significant disruption.[224] If the governmental agency concludes that
there are no significant adverse environmental impacts, or that with
appropriate prevention or mitigation efforts they will be minimized, it issues
a “finding of no significant impact” [FONSI].
If however, the FAA concludes the impacts are significant (which is
sometimes the case in a major airport project), the agency prepares an EIS.[225] The EIS must include an assessment of the
environmental impacts, and evaluate reasonable alternatives and suggest
appropriate mitigation measures.[226] It must review such issues as the impact of
the project on noise, air quality, water quality, endangered species, wetlands
and flood plains. However, the thrust
of the statute is process; there is no mandatory obligation to implement
mitigation measures, even if they are feasible.[227]
Congress has made fostering
intermodalism a central policy of the federal government. But as yet, the comprehensive implementation
of that goal has remained stubbornly unfulfilled. Many State Departments of Transportation are still effectively
State Highway Departments, no matter what they are called. One way to incorporate intermodal
considerations into all major transportation projects is to require the
preparation of an “Intermodal Impact Statement” in the planning process of all
major federal transportation projects.
Thus, no major new highways would be built without consideration of
access to transit lines, seaports and airports. No new airport projects would be built without consideration of
access of modal alternatives other than the automobile. As in environmental regulation, it would not
mean that a project could not be built without intermodal facilitation; it
would mean that no major project could be built unless intermodal facilitation
had been considered. That would require
many governmental institutions to plough new, and fertile, ground. In so doing, many more projects would be
made intermodal in design.
V.
CONCLUSIONS
As the gateways to an increasingly global market,
transportation corridors are the arteries through which we and everything we
consume flow. Transportation networks stimulate
trillions of dollars in trade, commerce, and tourism. In a global economy, they enable specialization in the production
of goods and services which, under the law of comparative advantage, stimulates
broader economic growth.
By shrinking the planet, transportation also
facilitates the intermingling and integration of disparate economies and
cultures. Cultural interaction enhances
international understanding which promotes global peace which, in a thermonuclear
world, is essential for survival of our species. It offers hope for the creation of a global village of friends
and neighbors rather than enemies and adversaries. Cultural interaction also stimulates intellectual social and
artistic creativity, making the world a more interesting and richer place in
which to live.
As a fundamental component of the infrastructure
upon which economic growth is built—the veins and arteries of commerce,
communications, and national defense—a healthy transportation system serving
the public’s needs for ubiquitous service at reasonable prices is vitally
important to region and the nation it serves.
It is for this reason that governments the world over have promoted,
encouraged, and facilitated its provision by providing essential
infrastructure, research and development, protective regulation, subsidies and,
on occasion, outright ownership.
Historically, government has facilitated transportation by guiding the
airports, the seaports, the rail and transit lines, subsidized their operations
where necessary, and established the basic codes and rules under which the
industry serves the public. If done
thoughtfully and well, government planning can facilitate creation of an
efficient and productive transportation infrastructure better able to satisfy
the broader needs of the public for safe, secure, seamless, expeditious and
reasonably priced transportation service.
The tourism and travel business is arguably the
world’s largest industry. It accounts
for 5.5% of the world’s GNP, 12.9% of consumer spending, 7.2% of worldwide
capital investment, and 127 million jobs, employing one in every 15
workers. The ripple effect of
transportation activity—the indirect and induced economic and employment
stimulation—is vastly larger than the prices paid directly by passengers or
shippers. Transportation creates and
transports wealth far in excess of its own facial value. In other words, the tacit benefits of
economic stimulation created by transportation networks far exceeds its costs.
In this sense, transportation has profound
externalities, both positive and negative.
For example, a city with abundant airline, motor carrier and railroad
networks radiating from it like the spokes of a wheel, enjoys a wide economic
catchment area stimulating trade, commerce and wealth for its citizens. Conversely, a community with poor, declining
or deteriorating access to the established and prevailing transportation
networks will wither like a human limb or organ starved of oxygen by an artery
made impassable by a tenacious blood clot.
On a macroeconomic level, these observations are
true for all nations and all regions, and arguably for all time. An expeditious, efficient, and economical
transportation network will facilitate the public’s need for mobility and will
ordinarily advance economic productivity and growth. Conversely, a deteriorating transportation infrastructure will
produce sluggishness in overall economic productivity and retard economic
growth.
The United States has
invested enormous unrecoverable resources in a transportation infrastructure
devoted to the wasteful and insatiable demands of highways and
automobiles. Though highways can
enhance individual mobility, as automobiles become ubiquitous, highways become
clogged in congestion, requiring the devotion of greater and greater resources
to satiate its insatiable thirst for asphalt.
The net result of a profligate dependence on the single occupancy
vehicle is that highways become wider and wider as waves of congestion demand
more traffic lanes, while suburban sprawl devours more and more real
estate. In the United States, disbursed
suburban housing patterns make the automobile indispensable, while denying
transit the population densities to support rail service. Land use, congestion, and pollution have
become chronic problems in many urbanized areas of the United States.
Moreover, a nation such as the United States, wedded
to the automobile, suffers adverse consequences beyond congestion. The automobile not only consumes land
insatiably, it pollutes the air. In
many of our cities, the automobile has made the air nearly unbreathable. These problems of gridlock and pollution are
chronic both in 1st world cities like Los Angeles, and 3rd
world cities like Bombay.
The burning of hydrocarbons like gasoline also spews
greenhouse gases, trapping the sun’s heat, thereby contributing to global
warming. During the 20th
Century, world energy consumption increased more than 12 times. Fuel consumption by the transportation
sector increased at a rate of 2.6% a year.
It shows no signs yet of slowing.
Fuel consumption at this rate not only creates
environmental hazards, it degenerates national economic wealth for
petroleum-importing nations. Given the
high cost of oil, a nation’s excessive demand can only erode its national wealth
by requiring a never-ending devotion of economic resources to the insatiable
demands for filling the automobile tank with gasoline.
An external effect of a transaction is a positive or
negative impact upon a person not a party to it.[228] The negative externalities of automobiles
are felt by other users of finite road and highway resources, and the
environment. Garrett Hardin, in his
powerful essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” provides insight as to the
economic forces leading a rational wealth maximizer to advance his own economic
interests by externalizing his costs:
Picture a pasture open to
all. It is to be expected that each
herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily
for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of
both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of
reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes
a reality. At this point, the inherent
logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.
As a
rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less
consciously, he asks, “What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to
my herd?” This utility has one negative
and one positive component.
(1) The positive component is a function of the
increment of one animal. Since the
herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the
positive utility is nearly +1.
(2) The negative component is a function of the
additional over-grazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the
herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is
only a fraction of 1.
Adding
together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that
the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his
herd. And another . . . . [b]ut that is the conclusion reached by each
and every rational herdsman sharing a commons.
Therein lies the tragedy. Each
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without
limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin
is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best
interest in a society that believes in the freedoms of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.[229]
The city streets are commons,
drivers are herdsmen, and the automobiles themselves are cattle. Every additional automobile on the street
brings the owner enhanced satisfaction of his desire for mobility. According to Hardin, “Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
freedom that believes in the freedoms of the commons.”[230]
Hardin’s main thesis is not about
the economic decline of herdsmen, but of the negative externality of another
sort—pollution. He says:
In a
reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of
pollution. Here it is not a question of
taking something out of the commons, but of putting something in. . . . The calculations of utility are much the
same as before . . . . Since this is
true for everyone, we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nests,’ so
long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.[231]
A comprehensive plan for an
expeditious, efficient and sustainable intermodal transport system for
passengers would include high-speed intercity rail linking major cities and
their airports, connecting at multimodal terminals with intracity busses, light
rail, subway transit networks, and bicycle lanes. For freight, it includes the building of rail and highway
networks linking industrial centers with seaports and airports in a way that
enhances the smooth and quick movement of containers between trucks, railroads,
ocean vessels and aircraft.
Seamlessness must be the goal of an
efficient intermodal system. In order
to achieve seamlessness, intermodal planning must include what we refer to as
the four C’s:
1.
CONNECTIONS
– All modes must be connected with one another to accomplish the convenient,
expeditious and efficient movement of commodities and people. Connecting should work well both from
geographic and temporal perspectives—that is, the connecting points should be
proximate to each other, and timed to facilitate movements from one mode to
another.
2.
CHOICES
– The intermodal network should allow its users to select that mode which can
most efficiently satisfy their transportation needs.
3.
COORDINATION
– Transportation infrastructure must be planned, designed and built in a way
that brings the modal networks together within sufficiently close proximity
that connections between them are relatively effortless. Transportation providers must coordinate their
schedules to reduce dwell time between intermodal movements.
4.
COOPERATION
– There must be collaboration between transportation providers to ensure that
the needs of the users for seamless service is realized.
By integrating the
separate transportation modes into a seamless, unified intermodal network,
transportation can not only meet the economic and mobility needs of a society,
but it can also alleviate the problems of pollution, congestion, safety, and
energy consumption. The strengths and
weaknesses of each mode should be identified, means must be developed to
minimize negative impacts and maximize strengths, and an efficient and
integrated transportation system should be established that is consonant with
the goal of sustainable development.
Each mode has its
inherent advantages in terms of speed, range, efficiency, and energy
consumption. Generally speaking, light
rail transit works well within a range of about 50 kilometers. Automobiles work well within 100
kilometers. Intercity rail transportation
has inherent strengths within a range of approximately 500 kilometers. And air transportation works well at
distances beyond that.
To take advantage of
the inherent advantages of alternative modes of transportation, each must be
available to users, and each should be seamlessly connected to one
another. A passenger stepping off an
aircraft should be able to proceed to baggage claim, and there catch a bus or
train to the central city, or an intercity train to another city. A container offloaded from an ocean vessel
should be moved expeditiously and directly to a flat bed truck trailer or rail
car for its beyond movement to its ultimate destination.
The inherent advantages of one mode of
transportation should not be mutilated by the inefficiencies of another. The primary advantage of air transportation,
for example, is speed. It must be
remembered that time is man’s most important commodity. Yet if the surface modes are clogged in
gridlock, more time can be consumed on the ground than in the air. Surface transit times between Don Muang
Airport and central Bangkok, for example, can consume several hours. Transportation movements are from origin-to
destination, and are the sum of the time consumed by each mode in the through
intermodal movement, plus the dwell time between modes. Time is money. Opportunity costs are the economic costs of lost time. An efficient transportation system in a
competitive economic environment requires that each mode moves as expeditiously
as possible, that each modal network is seamlessly connected to every other
network, and that distance and dwell time between modes are reduced. The comfort and convenience facilitated by
intermodal transportation planning will ensure that each mode is used based on
its inherent advantages of cost, speed, and environmental attributes by
consumers having ample choices and receiving proper pricing signals.
Law and regulation must serve the
needs of commerce for predictability of rules which make commercial sense,
facilitate efficient transactions, and do not burden commerce. To that end, streamlining of regulatory
responsibilities and rules across modes will do much to promote the seamless
intermodalism for which the nation should strive. Only in this way can the enlightened policies fostering seamless
intermodalism embraced by Congress be implemented.
[1] The foreign policy of the United States on this issue has been based upon the assumption that world output would be maintained at its optimum level if the movement of capital was unimpeded or uninhibited. Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment in the Southeastern United States, 9 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 247, 252-53 (1976).
[2] The Uniform Commercial Code has also implicitly recognized the contemporary increase in intermodal transportation. For example, the U.C.C. provides that a valid C.I.F. contract may be consummated which involves an intermodal land-sea movement under a through bill of lading, and that shipment from the specified inland point pursuant thereto is timely despite an inadvertently delayed loading aboard the ocean vessel. U.C.C. § 2-320, Comment 13.
[3] In Berry Transport, Inc., Ex. – Containers, 124 M.C.C. 328, 337-38 (1976), evidence was adduced demonstrating the following characteristics of containerized movements:
(1) Containerization of ocean cargo provides a faster, safer, more reliable door-to-door service at lower costs. The major economic advantage of containerization lies in its potential to reduce greatly the unit costs. Containerization transforms general cargo into a uniform size and shape which is provided by the container. In terms of unloading costs, containerization saves approximately 1.0 man-hour per ton of cargo, or 19 man-hours per container in handling. At a direct labor rate of $7 per man-hour, containerization saves over $13 on each ton of cargo loaded for labor alone.
(2) U.S. trade in containerable commodities has been increasing steadily in the past 5 years. Containerable imports increased by 49 percent and exports by 38 percent from 1967 to 1970.
(3) Year by year, increasing percentages of liner cargo have been containerized on all major U.S. trade routes. The annual capacity of full containerships in the Pacific Coast-Far East trade route will total 450,000 40-foot container equivalents in each direction by 1975. This capacity is of the order of 5 million long tons in each direction annually.
(4) The large, fast containerships have high daily cost. Therefore, it is especially important to minimize port time through investment in shore-side container handling equipment. Based upon a ship’s discharging and loading 780 containers, 2 extra days in port would cost $30 additional per container for just the ship’s time, and does not include additional costs for berth rental time.
(5) Containership berths with high productivity are very expensive to equip and require high throughput to achieve economical unit costs. One hundred percent utilization of a two-crane berth results in a cost of $12.50 per container; when utilization is reduced to 50 percent, the handling costs for each container is [sic] increased to $25.
(6) The combination of high containership daily costs and high container terminal throughput requirements makes it economically feasible to transfer cargo overland between nearby ports at lower total cost than by moving the ship. A containership which operates at 25 knots, and which is loaded and unloaded at each terminus in 3 days, completes a trans-Pacific round trip voyage totaling 9,000 miles in 21 days. This totals 17 voyages annually. However, if the time required for loading and unloading is increased to 5 days at each port terminus, the time required for each round trip increases to 25 days, and the number of annual voyages are [sic] reduced to 14.25, a reduction in productivity of 15 percent.
(7) Containerized cargo increases the market for truckers’ services for pickup and delivery or for transfer between relatively close ports. Handling costs per ton are reduced for truckers vis-à-vis conventional cargo, but line-haul costs per ton are increased because container dimensions are not optimal for over-the-road movements. Long hauls of containers appear to be unattractive to truckers. The primary role of motor carriers in container operations is the pickup and delivery of container loads at distances from the ports of less than about 400 miles, and the transfer of containers between nearby ports to save costly ship calls. In order to preserve inherent advantages to the shippers of through container movements it is necessary to provide for effective and proper coordination between water carriers and motor carriers. Only those carriers with flexible operations dedicated to container carriage can provide this coordinated service.
[4] Fox, Containerization: Present and Future, Traffic World, June 20, 1977, at 26.
[5] D. O’Neal, Intermodalism and Interagency Cooperation 2 (1977) (unpublished speech).
[6] V. Brown, Improved Productivity Through Merger and Intermodal Cooperation 5 (1977) (unpublished speech).
[7] The largest innovation in intermodal hardware was undoubtedly the switch from break bulk liner cargo service to containerization in the maritime industry. The change is little short of revolutionary. After initial innovations the railroads have operated a standard 89-foot line-haul vehicle for almost 20 years. That industry now appears to be on the brink of major innovations in line-haul piggyback equipment.
Id. at 7-8.
[8] These include combinations of rail/barge/shipping/truck (e.g., CSX now owns American Commercial Barge Lines, Sea-Land, and its own trucking company), truck/air (e.g., Consolidated Freightways now owns Emery Worldwide; Roadway Services now owns Roadway Air), rail/truck (e.g., Norfolk Southern now owns North American Van Lines; Union Pacific Railroad now owns Overnite Trucking), and shipping/truck combinations (American President Companies now owns a trucking company).
[9] The introduction of double stack railcars in 1984 propelled this trend. By 1993, there were 130 trains per week dedicated exclusively to containerized traffic moving on double stack railcars eastbound from the U.S. West Coast, for example.
[10] Prior to its sunset in 1996, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulated domestic common and contract carriers pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27, 301-327, 901-923, and 1001-1022 (1970).
[11] Prior to its sunset in 1985, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated air carriers under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S. C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970). The regulation of air transportation by the CAB was instituted in 1938 under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973. For an excellent analysis of the historical development of the movement to establish Federal regulation of this industry, see Comment, An Examination of Traditional Arguments on Regulation of Domestic Air Transport, 42 J. Air L. & Com. 187, 188-201 (1976). See also Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1072-73 (1962).
[12] The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) regulates ocean carriers pursuant to two statutes: the Shipping Act, 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1970), and the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, 46 U.S.C. §§ 843-848 (1970).
[13] Paul Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board - Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 Transportation Law Journal 91-185 (1979).
[14] See Paul Dempsey & Andrew Goetz, Airline Deregulation & Laissez Faire Mythology (Quorum 1991).
[15] Davis & Holder, Does the United States Have a Cohesive National Transportation Policy?—An Analysis, 41 I.C.C. Prac. J. 332, 338 (1974).
[16] 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1970); 46 U.S.C. §§ 843-848 (1970).
[17] Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended by 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1970) (known as part I of the ICA). As originally enacted, it consisted of only nine printed pages. During the intervening years, Congress added over 200 amendments so that the ICA and its index now consist of over 700 printed pages. Moreover, an additional 120 printed pages of regulatory responsibilities were enacted in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31.
[18] Ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456.
[19] Ch. 91, § 500, 41 Stat. 499 ( 49 U.S.C. § 142 (1970)).
[20] Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970)).
[21] Ch. 722, 54 Stat. 898 (49 U.S.C. §§ 901-923 (1970)).
[22] Part IV of the Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 318, 56 Stat. 284 (1942) ( 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1022 (1970)). Not only has the enormous regulatory responsibility conferred by Congress upon the ICC grown dramatically since 1920, but this nation’s transportation requirements have also become increasingly sophisticated and complex. The ICC today regulates over 18,000 transportation entities engaged in Interstate and foreign commerce. See I.C.C. 89th Ann. Rep. 120 (1975).
[23] National Transportation Policy, 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1970) (emphasis added). The need for coordination of the various transport agencies has long been recognized in this nation. As early as 1933, the Federal government took concerted action to effectuate coordination of the several transport modes. Aitchison, The Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act: 1887-1937, 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 289, 384-90 (1937).
[24] 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970).
[25] Id. § 1302.
[26] 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294 (1970).
[27] Id. § 1101.
[28] Emery Air Freight Corp., 339 I.C.C. 17, 35 (1971) (freight forwarder application).
[29] Investigation into Limitations of Carrier Service on C.O.D. and Freight-Collect Shipments, 343 I.C.C. 692, 729 (1973).
[30] Baumol & Walton, Full Costing, Competition and Regulatory Practice, 82 Yale L.J. 639, 653 (1973). See generally State Corp. Comm’n v. United States, 184 F. Supp. 691 (D. Kan. 1959); United States v. Garner, 134 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.N.C. 1955); City of Harrisonburg v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 34 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Va. 1940); Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F.2d 462 (S.D.W. Va. 1928); Akron, C. & Y. Ry. v. United States, 22 F.2d 199 (W.D.N.Y. 1927); Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co. v. United States, 6 F.2d 315 (N.D. Ohio 1925); Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards (pt. 3), 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1263 (1962); Rose, Regulation of Rates and Intermodal Transport Competition, 33 I.C.C. Prac. J. 11 (1965).
Under its power to establish minimum rates, the ICC could disapprove non-compensatory rates so as to avoid rate wars or destructive competition. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 629, 635 (E.D. Mo. 1962). However, the ICC was prohibited from nullifying the “inherent advantages” of one mode of transportation by increasing the rates of carriers having such advantages. Malone Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
[31] Schmeltzer & Peavy, Prospects and Problems of the Container Revolution, 1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 203, 205 (1970). In contrast to its “open door” policy with respect to international investment in most industries, the United States Congress has promulgated legislation specifically designed to prohibit or inhibit foreign investment in the field of transportation. Pursuant to the Jones Act, 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-889 (1970), the coastal and fresh water shipment of commodities or passengers between points in the United States or its territories must be accomplished in vessels which are constructed and registered in the United States, and which are owned by citizens of the United States. Before a corporation will be permitted to register a ship in the United States, the corporation’s principal officer and chairman of the board must be U.S. citizens and 75% of its stock must be held by U.S. citizens. 46 U.S.C. §§ 802, 833a, 888 (1970). Exemptions exist with respect to shipments incidental to the principal business of a foreign-controlled corporation which is engaged in mining or manufacturing within the United States, and with respect to the intercoastal transport of empty containers where the nation of the vessel’s registry grants reciprocal privileges to U.S. vessels. 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1970).
Foreign ownership is similarly restricted in the field of air transportation. Thus, a foreign air carrier is prohibited from acquiring control of a company engaged in any phase of aeronautics within the United States unless approval is obtained from the CAB. Ownership of 10% or more of the voting securities gives rise to a presumption of control, and aggregate foreign ownership is limited to 25%. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1378(f) (1970). A foreign air carrier is generally prohibited from performing domestic air transportation within the United States. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371, 1401(b), 1508 (1970). Such domestic transportation is limited to domestically registered aircraft. Eligibility to register such aircraft is limited to (a) U.S. citizens, (b) partnerships in which all members are U.S. citizens, or (c) U.S. corporations in which the president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other officers are U.S. citizens, and at least 75% of the voting stock is owned by U.S. citizens. The Conference Board, Foreign Investment in the United States: Policy, Problems and Obstacles 15 (1974); The Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Legal Environment for Direct Investment in the United States 28 (1972). But see Dempsey, Economic Aggression & Self-Defense in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and Alternative American Responses Thereto, 9 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 253, 294 (1977); Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment in the Southeastern United States, 9 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 247, 254-55 (1976).
[32] Compare H. Mertins, National Transportation Policy in Transition 162 (1972) with Angus, Legal Implications of “The Container Revolution” in International Carriage of Goods, 14 McGill L.J. 395 (1968).
[33] See generally Hern, Limitations on Liability of International Carriers, 13 N.Y.L.F. 522 (1967); Sassoon, Liability for the International Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Some Comparisons, 3 J. Mar. L. & Com. 759 (1972); Skulina, Liability of Carrier for Loss or Damage to International Shipments, 19 Clev. St. L. Rev. 146 (1970); Zamora Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport, 23 Am. J. Comp. L. 391 (1975).
[34] See Larner, Public Policy in the Ocean Freight Industry, in Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets 113 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
[35] Schmeltzer & Peavy, Prospects and Problems of the Container Revolution, 1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 203, 211 (1970).
[36] Lang, Demand and Supply: The Technology of Transportation, in The Future of American Transportation 54 (E. Williams, ed. 1971).
[37] Note, Legal and Regulatory Aspects of the Container Revolution, 57 Geo. L. J. 553, 535-37 (1969).
For a succinct examination of the myriad problems the container revolution and the recently increased utilization of intermodal transportation have posed for the traditional international legal framework and its terminology, see D. Sassoon, 5 British Shipping Laws 20-21 (2d ed 1975). See also Sassoon, Trade Terms and the Container Revolution, 1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 73, 78-84 (1969).
[38] TOFC transportation is not a recently developed form of carriage, but has been in existence since the inception of motor carrier regulation. See, e.g., Trucks on Flat Cars Between Chicago and Twin Cities, 216 I.C.C. 435 (1936).
[39] See Substituted Service—Charges and Practices of For-Hire Carriers and Freight Forwarders, 322 I.C.C. 301, 326-27 (1964), aff’d sub nom. American Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397 (1967), rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967). The initiation of TOFC service constituted, in the opinion of the ICC, probably the most significant recent development in transportation. Atchison T & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 955, 958 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
[40] Note, Coordination of Intermodal Transportation, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 247, 248 (1969).
[41] 49 U.S.C. § 316(c) (1970).
[42] A through or joint rate has been defined as a total combined charge for the entire journey of a shipment from point of origin to the ultimate consignee. Such transportation involves the performance of several carriers, frequently of different modes, and ordinarily constitutes a lesser charge than the sum of the single line rates. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 349 351 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff’d, 409 U.S. 1121 (1973).
[43] In re Tariffs Containing Joint Rates and Through Routes for the Transportation of Property Between Points in the United States and Points in Foreign Countries, 341 I.C.C. 246, 254 (1972). The voluntary nature of the establishment of such joint rates was emphasized and the ICC was prohibited from requiring their institution. See Great Western Packers Express, Inc. v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 151, 154-55 (D. Colo. 1965). However, once two or more carriers have voluntarily entered into through routes and joint rates and have filed such rates and charges with the ICC, neither carrier could subsequently terminate the routes or cancel the rates without demonstrating that the proposed change would be just and reasonable. T.I.M.E.—DC, Inc. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
[44] AAA Transfer, Inc., 120 M.C.C. 803, 820 (1974) (extension–cargo containers). See generally Marine Stevedoring Corp., 119 M.C.C. 514, 521 (1974) (common carrier application); Service Transfer, Inc., 117 M.C.C. 506, 514 (1972) (contract carrier application); Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 314 I.C.C. 287, 291 (1961), rev’d, 315 I.C.C. 591 (1962).
In Zirbel Transp., Inc., 125 M.C.C. 663, 677 (1976) (extension-containers), the benefits accruing from increased utilization of containerized transportation were set forth with particularity:
[I]t has always been the policy of this Commission to encourage the development of intermodal transportation, and we believe that containerization is a useful, innovative tool in that development. The services proposed in this and other recent applications offer numerous benefits directly to the shipping public. Among these benefits are: a reduction in packaging requirements; increased shipment integrity resulting in a reduction in loss, damage, and pilferage; less handling and warehousing; avoidance of terminal congestion and interchange delays; faster transit times; energy conservation; and more efficient use of equipment. The bottom-line benefit is, of course, less costly transportation of goods for the public at large.
This recognition, that containerization is a progressive and innovative development offering more efficient and economical transportation, also was articulated in decisions in which authority to transport outbound containerized commodities and inbound empty containers was denied. Compare Five Transp. Co., 125 M.C.C. 381, 387 (1976) (extension—Savannah, Ga.) with Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 314 I.C.C. 287, 291 (1961) (extension—Great Lakes), rev’d, 315 I.C.C. 591 (1962). For an earlier expression of the same concepts see Iron or Steel, In Containers—Central Territory, 54 M.C.C. 139, 153 (1952).
[45] See, e.g., Berry Transp., Inc., 124 M.C.C. 328 (1976) (extension–containers); Air-Land Transp., Inc. 120 M.C.C. 530 (1974) (common carrier application).
[46] Brooks, The Interstate Commerce Commission and Expanding Opportunities in Foreign Commerce 7 (May 26, 1976) (unpublished speech delivered at Shipper’s Dialogue—Mid-America, in Cleveland, Ohio); see Daily Express, Inc., 123 M.C.C. 343 (1974) (extension–intermodal container traffic).
[47] The ICC regulated domestic and foreign for-hire common and contract carriers pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1877, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27, 301-27, 901-23 and 1001-22 (1970) & Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as ICA]. The ICA was divided into four parts, each corresponding to a different mode of transportation subject to ICC regulation: part I concerned railroads, ICA §§ 1-27, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); part II dealt with motor carriers, ICA §§ 201-27, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); part III concerned domestic water carriers, ICA §§ 301-23, 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-23 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); and part IV involved freight forwarders, ICA §§ 401-22, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-22 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
[48] The CAB regulated air carriers pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The regulation of air transportation by the CAB was instituted in 1938 under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542). For an excellent analysis of the historical development of air regulation, see Keplinger, An Examination of Traditional Arguments on Regulation of Domestic Air Transport, 42 J. Air L. & Com. 187, 188-201 (1976). See also Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1072-73 (1962).
The CAB held jurisdiction over both domestic and foreign air carriers. An “air carrier” is defined by section 101(3) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 [hereinafter FAAct], 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1970), as one who engages, either directly or indirectly, in air transportation. See also FAAct § 101(19), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(9) (1970). A “direct air carrier” is generally defined as a person engaged in the operation of aircraft. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 296.1(d) (1977). This definition embraces a United States–flag air carrier holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued pursuant to FAAct § 401, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1970), a foreign air carrier operating pursuant to a permit issued under FAAct § 402, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1970), or an air carrier operating pursuant to authority conferred by any applicable regulation or order of the CAB. See FAAct § 416(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b) (1970); cf. 14 C.F.R. Part 298 (1977). The term “indirect air carrier” is generally defined as one who, although engaged in air transportation, is not engaged directly in the operation of aircraft, 14 C.F.R. § 296.1(e) (1977). Included within the classification of indirect air carriers are air freight forwarders and cooperative shipping associations subject to 14 C.F.R. Part 296 (1977), international air freight forwarders subject to 49 C.F.R. Part 297 (1976) and 14 C.F.R. § 287.1(a) (1977), domestic and foreign tour operators, 14 C.F.R. § 378.2(d), (d-1) (1977), and charter organizers and operators, 14 C.F.R. §§ 371.2, 372.2, 372a.2, 373.2 (1977). See Diederich, Protection of Consumer Interests Under the Federal Aviation Act, 40 J. Air L. & Com. 1, 3-8 (1974).
[49] The FMC regulates ocean carriers pursuant to two statutes; the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); and the Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933, 46 U.S.C. §§ 843-48 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
[50] See 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) with 46 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). See also Dempsey, Foreign Commerce Regulation Under the Interstate Commerce Act: An Analysis of Intermodal Coordination of International Transportation in the United States, 5 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 53 (1977).
[51] Emery Air Freight, Freight Forwarder Applic., 339 I.C.C. 17, 35 (1971).
[52] C.O.D. and Freight-Collect Shipments, 343 I.C.C. 692, 729 (1973).
[53] See Transfer of Equipment or Traffic at or near ports of entry on the United States-Canadian and the United States-Mexican International Boundary Lines, 110 M.C.C. 730, 742 (1969) [hereinafter cited as International Boundary Lines].
[54] See Substituted Service-Piggyback, 322 I.C.C. 301 (1964), aff’d sub nom., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 955 (1965), rev’d sub nom. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397 (1967); Trucks on Flat Cars Between Chicago and Twin Cities, 216 I.C.C. 435 (1936); Note, Piggyback Transportation and the I.C.C., 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 377 (1968). See also Containerized Freight, From and to Pacific Coast, 340 I.C.C. 388, 391 (1971); Ext.–Ex-Rail, 111 M.C.C. 251, 267 (1970) Mutrie Motor Transp., Inc.
[55] See, e.g., Moran Towing & Transp. Co., Ext.–Great Lakes, 314 I.C.C. 287, 291 (1961); Berry Transp., Inc.–Ext.–Containers, 124 M.C.C. 328 (1976); AAA Transfer, Inc., Ext.–Cargo Containers, 120 M.C.C. 803, 820 (1974); Iron or Steel, In Containers–Central Territory, 54 M.C.C. 139, 153 (1952). Cf. Five Transp. Co. Ext.–Savannah, Ga., 125 M.C.C. 381, 387 (1976) (ICC denied applicant motor carrier operating authority to transport containerized commodities but explicitly affirmed the principle of fostering intermodal containerized services).
[56] 125 M.C.C. 663 (1976).
[57] Id. at 677.
[58] 120 M.C.C. 803 (1974).
[59] Id. at 818.
[60] Brown Transport Corp. Ext.–General Commodities in Containers, 126 M.C.C. 684, 712 (1977); Holt Motor Express, Inc., Ext.–Baltimore, Md., 120 M.C.C. 323, 329-30 (1974); IML Freight, Inc., Ext.–Containerized Freight, 118 M.C.C. 31, 32 (1973).
[61] See, e.g., Berry Transport, Inc., Ext.–Containers, 124 M.C.C. 328 (1976); Air Land Transport, Inc., Common Carrier Applic., 120 M.C.C. 530 (1974).
[62] Eastern States Transp. Pa., Inc., A Delaware Corp., Ext.–Malt Beverages, 123 M.C.C. 725, 737-38 (1975); P.B. Mutrie Motor Transp., Inc., Ext.–Benzyl Chloride, 83 M.C.C. 123, 131 (1960).
[63] Daily Express, Inc., Ext.-Intermodal Container Traffic, 123 M.C.C. 343 (1974).
[64] 49 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1970).
[65] 49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(11) (1970). The term “foreign commerce” is also defined to include transportation between points in a foreign country, or between points in two foreign countries, insofar as such transportation takes place within the United States. Such movements are, however, subject to regulation for purposes of insurance, designation of an agent for service of process, qualification and working hours of employees, and safety. Id. Motor carriers operating in foreign commerce were also required to file with the ICC a certificate of insurance, surety bond, proof of qualification as a self-insurer, or other securities or agreement to pay final judgment for bodily injuries or for the loss or damage of property. 49 C.F.R. 1043.11 (1976).
Although Puerto Rico is not a foreign nation, it is a place outside the United States within the purview of part III of the ICA. It was declared by specific legislative enactment that the ICA is inapplicable to Puerto Rico. 48 U.S.C. § 751 (1970). Thus, the issue of whether a public need exists for transportation to and from points in Puerto Rico is beyond the jurisdiction of the ICC. Trans-Caribbean Motor Transport, Inc., Common Carrier Applic., 66 M.C.C. 593, 596 (1956). However, transport operations performed between points in the continental United States and points in Puerto Rico appear to fall within the definition of “foreign commerce” contained in ICA § 303(a)(11), 49 U.S.C. 303(a)(11), to the extent that such operations are performed within the United States. Moreover, through transport movements between Puerto Rico and foreign nations which traverse the continental United States appear to fall within the land bridge exemption, although no ICC decisions have specifically so held.
[66] Melburn Truck Lines (Toronto) Co., Ltd., Common Carrier Applic., 124 M.C.C. 39, 49 (1975).
[67] Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
[68] Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, April 2, 1953, United States–Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
[69] Id. at 2078, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
[70] Paul Dempsey, Antitrust Law & Policy in Transportation: Monopoly I$ the Name of the Game, 21 Georgia Law Review 505-99 (1987)
[71] For example, the Commission approved the CSX's proposals to purchase American Commercial Lines (one of the nation's largest barge operators) and Sea-Land (one of the largest carriers of oceanborne, containerized freight).
1 49 U.S.C. § 11344(C) (1982).
2 Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Barker Motor Freight, Inc., 5 M.C.C. 9, 11 (1937). For an excellent analysis of these principles, see Erenberg & Kasson, Railroad-Motor Carrier Intermodal Ownership, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 75, 82-91 (1981).
3 See, e.g., Rock Island Motor Transit Co.-Purchase-White Line Motor Freight Co., 40 M.C.C. 457 (1946) (granting motor carrier permit to railroad subsidiary on condition that carrier only perform service auxiliary to rail transport), rev’d sub nom. Rock Island Motor Transit Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ill. 1949), rev’d, 340 U.S. 419 (1951); Kansas City S. Transp. Co., Common Carrier Application, 10 M.C.C. 221 (1938) (denying motor carrier permit to company that made agreement with railway to share facilities, customers, and revenue with railway), modified, 28 M.C.C. 5 (1941); Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc.,-Acquisition of Control of Barker Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 1 M.C.C. 101 (1936) (denying authorization of rail carrier’s purchase of motor freight company); cf. 49 U.S.C. § 11344(c) (1982) (ICC may approve and authorize rail carrier’s application for transaction involving motor carrier only if transaction is consistent with public interest, will enable rail carrier to use motor carrier transportation to public advantage, and will not unreasonably restrain competition).
4 See American Trucking Ass’ns v. United States, 364 U.S. 1 (1960) (upholding National Transportation Policy goal of preventing railroads from invading trucking industry); American Trucking Ass’ns v. United States, 355 U.s. 141 (1957) (affirming ICC’s authority to impose restrictions on railroad operation of motor carriers but finding it to be merely policy and not a rigid limitation).
5 See, Beardsley, Integrated ownership of Transportation Companies and the Public Interest, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 85, 92-96 (1962) (discussing development of congressional policy concerning railroad ownership of non-rail carrier authority).
6 Rock Island Motor Transit Co. Common Carrier application, 63 M.C.C. 91, 102 (1954).
7 See Applications for Motor Carrier Operating Authority by Railroads and Rail Affiliates, 132 M.C.C. 978 (1982).
8 See Johnson, Seven Transportation Megatrends for the late `980s, 58 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 164, 177-78 (1986).
9 See ICC, STAFF REPORT NO. 10, at 15 (1986). In August 1986, BN received approval to acquire Stoops Express Inc., Wingate Trucking Co., Inc., and Taylor-Maid Transportation, Inc. through its subsidiary , Burlington Northern Motor carriers, Inc. It had already acquired Monkem co., Inc., Monroe Trucking Inc., and Victory Freightway System. See Three More BN Truck Buys Authorized by Commission Without Formal Scrutiny, TRAFFIC WORLD, Aug. 4, 1986, at 36.
10 See D. SWEENEY, C. McCARTHY, S. KALISH & J. CUTLER, JR., TRANSPORTATION DEREGULATION: WHAT’S REGULATED AND WHAT ISN’S 25-26 (1986).
11 See Machalaba & Williams, Union Pacific To Buy Overnite for $1.2 Billion, Wall St. J., Sept 19, 1986, at 3, col. 1; McGinley & Machalaba, ICC Clears Union {Pacific’s Plan To Buy Overnite Transportation for $1.2 Billion, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1987, at 5, col. 1.
12 801 F.2d 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
13 See id. at 1430-31.
14 49 U.S.C. §11344(c) (1982).
15 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F2d at 1427.
16 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
17 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d at 1423-26.
17 Id. at 1427.
17 Acquisition of motor carriers by Railroads, Ex parte No. 438, slip op. (I.C.C. July 27, 1984).
18 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. ICC, 801 F.2d at 1430. For discussion of the reaction to this ruling, see McGinley, Norfolk Southern Pact with Trucker Faces Rehearing, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1986, at 15, col. 1.
19 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 3403, 100 Stat. 3207, 3309.
20 818 F. 2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
21 Footnote 2, however, appears to embrace a restrictive interpretation of the statute, limiting the acquisition of motor carriers to those to be used ‘only as an adjunct to rail movements.” Id. at 89 n.2. For an excellent review of this area of the law, and a strong argument that the statute should not be so interpreted, see Andrews, Intermodal Acquisitions After BN and Teamsters: A Case Study in Judicial Re-Regulation, 37 YOUR LETTER OF THE LAW 9 (1987).
22 In an opinion highly critical of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the District of Columbia Circuit also circumscribed the ICC’s ability to approve intermodal acquisitions through the exemption mechanism. See Regular Common Carrier Conference v. United States, 820 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
23 49 U.S.C. § 11344 (d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
24 Id. § 11321 (a), (b).
25 See Crounse Corp. v. ICC, 781 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir.) (affirming the ICC’s decision), cert. denied, 197 S. Ct. 290 (1986); D. SWEENEY, C. McCARTHY, S. KALISH & J. CUTLER, JR., supra at 26-27.
[72] 49 CFR 1039.13; 49 CFR Part 1090.
[73] 49 CFR §1039.
[74] Interstate Commerce Commission v. Texas, 479 U.S. 450 (1987).
[75] TTX Co., et al. - Application for Approval of the Pooling of Car Service With Respect to Flat Cars, Finance Docket No. 27590 (Sub-No. 2) (ICC served Aug. 31, 1994).
[76] 49 U.S.C. §10505(e),(f),(g).
[77] 49 U.S.C. § 10707 (2000).
[78] Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 719 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953 (1984).
[79] Potomac Electric Power Co. v. ICC, 744 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
[80] See Paul Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commission: Disintegration of An American Legal Institution," 34 American University Law Review 1-51 (1984); Paul Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in Transportation: The Genesis and Evolution of This Endangered Species, 32 American University Law Review 335-375 (1983); Paul Dempsey, Congressional Intent and Agency Discretion - Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 58 Chicago Kent Law Review 1-58 (1982).
[81] Donald Witnah, U.S. Department of Transportation: A Reference History 6 (Greenwood 1998).
[82] Report on Regulatory Agencies To the President Elect (1960).
[83] See "Report of the Committee on Commerce by its Special Study Group on Transportation Policies in the United States," S. Rept. No. 445, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
[84] Congress created a comprehensive program of transit assistance in the Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964. H.R. Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The first long-term commitment for transit was the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970. The Federal Highway Act of 1973 opened the highway trust fund to transit, while the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 made operating expenses eligible for Federal funding.
[85] Donald Witnah, U.S. Department of Transportation: A Reference History 9-10 (Greenwood 1998).
[86] Donald Witnah, U.S. Department of Transportation: A Reference History 11 (Greenwood 1998).
[87] Donald Witnah, U.S. Department of Transportation: A Reference History 11 (Greenwood 1998).
[88] 49 U.S.C. § 13101(a)(2). See Paul Dempsey, Foreign Commerce Regulation Under the Interstate Commerce Act: An Analysis of Intermodal Coordination of International Transportation in the United States, 5 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 53, 57-59 (1977).
[89] An Interagency Committee on Intermodal Cargo was created in 1973 to coordinate the activities of the DOT, ICC, CAB, and FMC on intermodal issues. See Paul Dempsey, The Contemporary Evolution of Intermodal and International Transport Regulation Under the Interstate Commerce Act, 10 Vanderbilt J. Transnat’l L. 505, 555 (1977).
[90] 49 U.S.C § 101. See Joseph Thompson, ISTEA Reauthorization and the National Transportation Policy, 25 Transp. L.J. 87, 99 (1997).
[91] 23 U.S.C. § 134(a).
[92] Though ISTEA emphasized a national policy of promoting a seamless system of intermodal transportation, facilitation of intermodalism may be proceeding sluggishly in certain regions.
[93] Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Conference Report, H.R. No. 102-404, 102nd Cong., (Nov. 27, 1991).
[94] Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Conference Report, H.R. No. 102-404, 102nd Cong., (Nov. 27, 1991).
[95] Jayne Daly, Transportation and Clean Air: Making the Land Use Connection, 1995 Pace L. Rev. 141, 148 (1995).
[96] Penny Mintz, Transportation Alternatives Within the Clean Air Act: A History of Congressional Failure to Effectuate and Recommendations for the Future, 3 N.Y.U. Env’tl. L.J. 156, 180 (1994).
[97] U.S. Federal Highway Administration, A Guide to the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program 1 (1994).
[98] U.S. Federal Highway Administration: Air Quality Programs and Provisions of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 6 (1992).
[99] Theodore Taub & Katherine Castor, ISTEA—Too Soon To Evaluate Its Impact, ALI-ABA Land Use Institute (Aug. 16, 1995).
[100] Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Conference Report, H.R. No. 102-404, 102nd Cong., (Nov. 27, 1991).
[101] U.S. Federal Highway Administration: Air Quality Programs and Provisions of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 9-10 (1992).
[102] Mark Solof, History of Metropolitan Planning Organizations – Part IV 5 (1998).
[103] U.S. Federal Highway Administration: Air Quality Programs and Provisions of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 14 (1992).
[104] 23 U.S.C. § 134.
[105] U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Infrastructure: Managing the Costs of Large-Dollar Highway Projects 14-15 (Feb. 1997).
[106] Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Conference Report, H.R. No. 102-404, 102nd Cong., (Nov. 27, 1991) [emphasis supplied].
[107] Pub. L. No. 105-178.
[108] William Vantuono, TEA 21: Uncomplicated Answers for Complicated Questions, Railway Age (Sept. 1, 1998), at 16; American Public Transit Ass’n, TEA 21: A Summary of Transit Related Provisions 6 (1998). For example, under the $217 billion authorization bill (the largest infrastructure bill in U.S. history), funding was significantly increased for the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Program (by 35%) as well as for transit (by 50%). Bud Shuster, Shuster Applauds Gore’s “Better America Bonds”, Press Release (Jan. 11, 1999).
[109] Emphasis supplied.
[110] 49 U.S.C. § 302(e) (2000).
[111] 49 U.S.C. § 101(b)(2) (2000).
[112] 49 U.S.C. § 301(3) (2000).
[113] 49 U.S.C. § 301(7) (2000).
[114] 46 U.S.C. § 1503(e) (2000).
[115] 49 U.S.C. § 47101(b)(1) (2000).
[116] 49 U.S.C. § 47101(b)(3) (2000).
[117] 49 U.S.C. § 47101(b)(5) (2000).
[118] 106 Pub. L. 181; 114 Stat. 61 (Apr. 5, 2000).
[119] 49 U.S.C. § 47171(b)(8) (2000).
[120] 49 U.S.C. § 5501(a) (2000).
[121] 49 U.S.C. § 5501(b)(1) (2000).
[122] 49 U.S.C. § 5501(b)(2) (2000).
[123] 49 U.S.C. § 5501(b)(3) (2000).
[124] 49 U.S.C. § 5501(b)(4) (2000).
[125] 49 U.S.C. § 5501(b)(5) (2000).
[126] 49 U.S.C. § 5501(b)(6) (2000).
[127] 49 U.S.C. § 5501(b)(7) (2000).
[128] 49 U.S.C. § 5501(b)(8) (2000).
[129] 49 U.S.C. § 5501(c) (2000).
[130] Pub. L. 105-134, 111 Stat. 2571 (Dec. 2, 1997).
[131] 49 U.S.C. § 13101(a) (2000).
[132] 49 U.S.C. § 13101(a)(1)(A) (2000). See also 49 U.S.C. § 15101 (2000) (pipeline transportation).
[133] 49 U.S.C. § 13101(a)(2)(K) (2000).
[134] 39 U.S.C. § 5210 (2000).
[135] Those classified as Transportation Management Areas, or generally, those with a population of 200,000 or more.
[136] Two important structural changes were added by ISTEA. First, it required MPOs to include several new types of stakeholders (including transportation providers and the public) in the planning process. Second, it required an expansion of the boundaries of the planning area to include space for the next 20 years of expected urban growth, and to encompass the area in the air quality region (if the region experiences air quality problems).
[137] CMAQ fund allocation is the responsibility of the State DOT. Project selection should occur cooperatively between the MPO and the State DOT.
[138] The LRP and the TIP must be financially constrained (meaning they should only include projects for which full funding can reasonably be expected). They must also include public participation in their preparation, including participation by citizens and transportation providers. In air quality non-attainment areas, the LRP and TIP must conform with the State’s air quality implementation plan. The TIP incorporates all Federally-supported projects in the metropolitan area, including those for which the State has primary responsibility. Once the TIP is approved by the MPO, it must be approved by the State Governor, and incorporated into the State Transportation Improvement Program [STIP].
[139] 23 U.S.C. § 134(a)(3), 49 U.S.C. §5303(a)(2) (2000).
[140] 23 U.S.C. § 135(a)(3) (2000).
[141] 23 U.S.C. § 134(f)(7) (2000).
[142] The plan should be reviewed and updated at least triennially in nonattainment areas, and every five years in attainment areas to confirm its validity and its consistency with current and projected transportation and land use conditions and trends during the forecast period. After an adequate opportunity for public official and citizen involvement in the development of the plan, it must be approved by the MPO. 23 CFR § 450.322(c); 23 CFR § 450.322(a). In non-attainment and maintenance areas for transportation related pollutants, the MPO, FWHA and FTA must make a Clean Air Act conformity determination of any new or revised plan. 23 CFR § 450.322(d); see 40 CFR Part 51.
[143] 23 CFR § 450.308(c).
[144] 23 U.S.C. §§ 134 (a)(3), 217 (g)(1); 49 U.S.C. § 5303 (a)(2) (2000).
[145] 23 U.S.C. § 135 (2000).
[146] 49 U.S.C. § 5504(a) (2000).
[147] 23 U.S.C. § 505 (2000).
[148] 23 U.S.C. § 505(b)(1) (2000).
[149] 23 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000).
[150] 23 U.S.C. § 303(e) (2000).
[151] 10 U.S.C. § 2631a(a) (2000).
[152] 42 U.S.C. § 5195, Executive Order 12472 (Apr. 3, 1984).
[153] 46 U.S.C. § 1187b(b) (2000).
[154] 23 U.S.C. § 103(b)(1)(A) (2000).
[155] 23 U.S.C. § 181(8)(D) (2000).
[156] 49 U.S.C. § 5302 (2000).
[157] 49 U.S.C. § 5562(a)(1) (2000).
[158] 49 U.S.C. § 5563(a)(1) (2000).
[159] 49 U.S.C. § 5562(a)(4) (2000).
[160] 49 U.S.C. § 5564(c)(1)(A) (2000).
[161] 49 U.S.C. § 22101(a)(3) (2000).
[162] 45 U.S.C. § 822(b)(1) (2000).
[163] 45 U.S.C. § 822(c)(6) (2000).
[164] 49 U.S.C. § 26101(a) (2000).
[165] 49 U.S.C. § 26101(b)(1)(J) (2000).
[166] 49 U.S.C. § 24311(a)(1)(B) (2000).
[167] 49 U.S.C. § 47107(b).
[168] 14 C.F.R. Part 158.
[169] FAA Order 5100.3A, para. 553(a), AIP Handbook (Oct. 24, 1989).
[170] Quoted in U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, Intermodal Ground Access To Airports: A Planning Guide 16, 202 (Dec. 1996).
[171] Stalled Train to Kennedy Airport, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1998, at A20. Letter from FAA Associate Administrator Susan Kurland to Port Authority Executive Director George Marlin (Nov. 6, 1996).
[172] The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey alleged that the line would create “a more efficient vehicular flow at the airport by removing buses, shuttle vans, and private autos currently used by air passengers, airport visitors, and airport employees at JFK . . . ”, and that without the line, “ground access congestion would constrain projected O&D passenger growth at JFK and adversely affect the national air transportation system.” Letter from FAA Associate Administrator Susan Kurland to Port Authority Executive Director Robert Boyle of Feb. 9, 1998, at 20.
[173] Id. at 21.
[174] Id. at 24.
[175] Id.
[176] Matthew Wald, U.S. Approves Plan for Rail Link to Kennedy Airport, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1998.
[177] U.S. General Accounting Office, Surface Infrastructure: Costs, Financing and Schedules for Large-Dollar Transportation Projects 18 (Feb. 1998).
[178] Letter from FAA Associate Administrator Susan Kurland to SFO Airport Director John Martin (Oct. 18, 1996).
[179] Benjamin Pimentel, BART’s 4-Year Trip to SFO Starts Today, San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 3, 1997, at 1.
[180] U.S. General Accounting Office, Surface Infrastructure: Costs, Financing and Schedules for Large-Dollar Transportation Projects 40 (Feb. 1998).
[181] U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act: Flexible Funding Opportunities for Transportation Investments 4 (1996).
[182] Id. at 13.
[183] U.S. General Accounting Office, Surface Infrastructure: Costs, Financing and Schedules for Large-Dollar Transportation Projects 57 (Feb. 1998).
[184] U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, Intermodal Ground Access to Airports: A Planning Guide 16, 203 (Dec. 1996).
[185] 22 U.S.C. § 2296(11) (2000).
[186] 23 U.S.C. § 502(d)(1) (2000).
[187] 49 U.S.C. § 5503(d) (2000).
[188] 49 U.S.C. § 112(d)(4) (2000).
[189] 49 U.S.C. § 111 (c) (2000).
[190] 49 U.S.C. § 305(b)(1)(B) (2000).
[191] 49 U.S.C. § 111 (d) (2000).
[192] 49 U.S.C. § 111 (e)(2) (2000).
[193] 49 U.S.C. § 5505(c)(2)(DP (2000).
[194] 49 U.S.C. § 5504(j)(2)(A).
[195] 49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(c)(2), (4) (2000).
[196] 49 U.S.C. § 309(b)(2)(B)(ii)(VII) (2000).
[197] 49 U.S.C. § 5506(a) (2000).
[198] Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 2160 (Dec. 18, 1991).
[199] Pub. L. 102-548, 102 Stat. 3549 (Oct. 28, 1992).
[200] 23 U.S.C. § 103(7)(A) (2000).
[201] Pub. L. 105-178, 112 Stat. 136 (June 9, 1998).
[202] Sec. 5028, Pub. L. 105-178, 112 Stat. 445 (June 9, 1998).
[203] 15 U.S.C. § 2702(5) (2000).
[204] 49 U.S.C. § 14706(g)(2)(B) (2000).
[205] Pub. L. 94-587, 90 Stat. 2933 (Oct. 22, 1976).
[206] 46 U.S.C. § 1710a (a)(4), (b) (2000).
[207] 49 U.S.C. § 10502(f) (2000).
[208] 45 U.S.C. § 821(5) (2000).
[209] 49 U.S.C. § 10102(6) (2000).
[210] 46 U.S.C. § 1710a(a)(4) (2000).
[211] 49 U.S.C. § 13506 (a)(11) (2000).
[212] 49 U.S.C. § 5902(b)(2000).
[213] 7 U.S.C. § 4402(3) (2000).
[214] 59 U.S.C. § 31120(c)(1) (2000).
[215] 46 U.S.C. § 876(a)(2) (2000).
[216] Pub. L. 105-134; 111 Stat. 2574 (Dec. 2, 1997).
[217] 49 U.S.C. § 5503 (2000).
[218] 49 U.S.C. § 5502 (2000).
[219] U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Cargo Liability Study (Aug. 1998).
[220] Some of this problem can be, and sometimes is, ameliorated by the insertion of a contractual provision, such as a Himalaya Clause, which identifies the legal regime which will govern the shipment from origin to destination.
[221] Paul Dempsey & William Thoms, Law & Economic Regulation In Transportation 297 (Quorum 1986); Paul Dempsey, Robert Hardaway & William Thoms, 2 Aviation Law & Regulation § 15 (Butterworth 1993).
[222] Paul Dempsey & William Thoms, Law & Economic Regulation In Transportation 308 (Quorum 1986).
[223] 49 U.S.C. § 4321.
[224] Federal Aviation Administration, Airport Master Plans 49-50 (1985).
[225] James Spensley, Airport Planning, in Airport Regulation, Law & Public Policy 76 (R. Hardaway ed. 1991).
[226] 49 U.S.C. § 4332(c).
[227] See Stryckers Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
[228] Paul Dempsey, Market Failure &
Regulatory Failure As Catalysts for Political Change: The Choice Between
Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 Washington & Lee L. Rev. 1, 17 (1989).
[229] Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science (Dec. 13, 1968), at 1243.
[230] Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science (Dec. 13, 1968), at 1243.
[231] Id.
See Paul Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation &
Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure, 24 Transportation Law Journal
73-120 (1996).
Download the Microsoft word file of this article
[About NCIT
] [NCIT
Contact] [Announcements]
[Intermodal
Links] [NCIT
Home]